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Dark times lie ahead of us and there will be a time when we must choose between what is easy and what
is right
- A. Dumbledore
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2 Abstract
In this thesis I examine the incentives in three different fields: firms FDI relocation, dishonest be-
haviour, and workers productivity.
Extrinsic incentives, contrary to the intrinsic ones, are the ones that come from outside, typically in
the form of financial reward, but also in the form of status or others perceptions on the subject. When
it comes to money, we tend to think that the more the merrier, but there are some other factors that
affect our reaction to monetary incentives, which are not always predictable. This could be the case of
risk aversion, social preferences, or physycally manipulating money. These factors are highly relevant,
as I will show, for the design of incentives on the workplace, information disclosure and environmental
policy. I examine these incentives in my three chapters.
Chapter 1 examines the effects of risk incentives in the workplace. For that, we design an experiment
in which we compare the performance of subjects participating in the slider game in a 5 period setting.
Participants are allocated in groups of 5, but work individually. In the first treatment, subjects receive
a bonus in the form of a piece rate for performing above a minimum. In the second treatment, subjects
receive a bonus that is 5 times higher than in the piece rate, but will only be received with a probability
of 1 in 5. Lastly, in the third treatment, we combine all the bonuses earned by the 5 players in the group
in a single lottery prize, which is randomly allocated. Nonetheless, the probability of receiving the prize
increases with relative performance. In all treatments subjects are anonymous and able to observe the
productivity of the other members or the group. Although we do not obtain significant difference between
the three treatments in the point estimates, the productivity growth in both lottery treatments is sig-
nificantly higher trough the periods. We speculate that seeing someone earning a high prize incentivises
subjects to exert more effort, although risk averseness and observing a high performance from their peers
work as discouraging factors in the group lottery treatment.
Chapter 2 examines the effects of a gain and a loss domain, combined with a setting with and without
money manipulation in the dishonest behaviour of subjects. Subjects participate in the dice game, where
they anonymously report the result from rolling a 10-sided dice. Since the design is anonymous, we can
only observe cheating on average. We examine 2 dimensions: Gain and Loss, and Money-Manipulation
and No-Manipulation. In the Loss treatment, subjects receive an initial endowment of 5 Euros in advance,
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while in the Gain treatment they can earn 5 pounds depending on the reported outcome. Gain and Loss
then differ in the way we frame the gains: as amounts that subjects can earn or return from an initial
endowment. We additionally implement a treatment where subjects are paid a flat fee regardless of the
reported outcome. Both the gain and loss frames are carried out with and without money manipulation.
In the money manipulation design, subjects receive a 5 Euro note before the loss frame, and take the
money from an envelope in the gain frame. We observe that the effect of the gain and loss frame depends
on whether subjects physically handle money or not, and we discuss the psychological effects of manipu-
lating money on the moral cost of cheating.
Chapter 3 examines the effects of the environmental regulation in a host country on a multinational
firms incentives to engage in foreign direct investment (FDI). I develop a theoretical model of trade with
2-country setting (North and South), and focus on the Southern market. I demonstrate that the incen-
tives for a firm to internationalise do not only depend on the environmental regulation of the recipient
country but also in the mode of entry. This means that setting a new factory (Greenfield) and buying
an existing one in the host country (Mergers and Acquisitions), have different sensitivity towards the
strictness of the environmental regulation, and its effects are not always straightforward. I conclude that,
in accord with the empirical findings in other studies, a more strict environmental regulation does not
always deter FDI when we take into account the entry mode.
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3 CHAPTER 1
Risky Incentives in Labour Contracts: An
Experiment
with Neil Scott 1
1 Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London
3.1 Introduction
It is not uncommon for lotteries to be used as incentive mechanisms for participation in tasks; par-
ticipation in online surveys is often incentivised at the extensive margin by entry to a prize draw to win
an iPad, or a large face value in vouchers, for example. If would-be participants were offered the cash
equivalent expected value of such lotteries for their time, it is unlikely they would participate: although
we know that the expected value is infinitesimally small, we tend to neglect the cost of our effort at the
prospect of winning a valuable prize Rachlin (1990).
But real life examples of such lottery incentive mechanisms are less easy to think of at the intensive
margin. In particular, can lotteries be used as an incentive mechanism to induce high effort (and thus
productivity)? There is an extensive literature within personnel economics on mechanisms to induce
optimal effort for the firm, which we summarise below (Lazear 1986, and Freeman, 1998 among others),
though surprisingly little research exists on mechanisms through which lotteries might incentivise effort.
One of the most utilised theoretical models in the personnel economics literature is the agency theory
model, which assumes that a worker (agent) bears some disutility of effort, while the firm (principal) sets
a wage that seeks to incentivise an optimal effort level such that profit is maximised (Ross, 1973; Stiglitz,
1989). If both parties incentives are not aligned, this can result in the agent selecting to exert suboptimal
effort, and thus the firm obtains suboptimal profits. Many solutions to this problem have been proposed
, however it is often found to be prohibitively expensive for the firm to incentivise effort over and above
the reservation level in equilibrium.
Various mechanisms have been proposed to optimally incentivise high effort in a manner that is prof-
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itable for the firm, most notably efficiency wages and piece rates (Prendergast, 1999; Ariely et al., 2009;
Lazear, 2000; Lazear, 1986). However such mechanisms have been found to be empirically problematic
for two main reasons. Firstly, measuring individual worker productivity is not always practically possible,
or can be costly to the firm where it is (Freeman, 1998). Secondly, because effort is imperfectly correlated
with productivity, and it is productivity that is ultimately incentivised by the firm, the worker takes on
some risk when exerting additional effort; to incentivise high effort the firm must therefore compensate
both the workers disutility of effort and the risk the workers takes on (Pendergast, 2002). The costs to
the firm of incentivising high effort are therefore often prohibitive when weighed against the productivity
gains.
There is some suggestive evidence in the literature that workers effort response may be higher where
productivity incentives involve risk (Bandiera et al., 2005; Rula et al., 2014; Celis et al., 2013). We
contribute by reviewing this evidence, and testing it in a controlled laboratory experiment. For that, we
propose an experiment in which subjects are randomly allocated to three treatments, in each of which
subjects receive a fixed payment for achieving a minimum standard of effort, plus a bonus for produc-
tivity over and above that minimum standard. In the first treatment this takes the form of a piece rate
bonus, in which subjects are paid a fixed value for each unit of productivity over and above the minimum
threshold. In the second treatment, the bonus is paid in the form of an individual lottery, in which
subjects add a value five times higher than the piece rate to their bonus pot with each additional unit of
productivity, but only receive the bonus with 20% probability (such that the expected value is the same
as the piece rate). The third treatment takes the form of a group lottery bonus, where each member of a
group receives a lottery ticket with the same expected value as the piece rate bonus for productivity over
and above the threshold, and a winning ticket is randomly drawn such that one subject wins the entire
group bonus pot. Each treatment is played across five rounds (with bonuses allocated each round), and
subjects can can observe other group members productivity. The experiment utilises a real effort task to
ensure a strong positive relationship between effort and productivity.
We find that (i) lottery incentives are at least as effective as piece rates in incentivising effort; (ii) risk
aversion affects positively the performance in the piece rates treatment comparative to lottery incentives
(iii) other group members performance in the previous period is positively related to current subject
performance in the piece rate treatment, but negatively related to performance in the group lottery
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treatment. When controlling for observables, we further find that the group lottery incentivises higher
growth in productivity over time (comparative to piece rates), and we disseminate the causal behavioural
factors influencing the overall result. Our objective is to propose a more efficient reward structure that
could be optimally implemented in a real workplace environment.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we review the literature on effort incentive
mechanisms; Section 3 presents the theoretical predictions; Section 4 sets out the experimental design;
Section 5 presents the results of the experiment; Section 6 offers a discussion of the results, and the
behavioural factors driving the overall effect; Section 7 concludes.
3.2 Literature review
According to contract theory, exerting high levels of effort is fatiguing to the worker, such that effort
is costly in utility terms; the firms output is, however, positively related to effort. The incentives of
employees and employers are clearly therefore not necessarily aligned, and so firms must design a com-
pensation scheme that aligns these interests. This is the essence of principal agency theory.
Various compensation mechanisms exist in the personnel economics literature, which attempt to align
these interests. Mechanisms such as delayed compensation and efficiency wages increase the value of
retaining the job to the worker, while others such as piece rates and tournaments link compensation to
absolute or relative performance. Incentives that directly link compensation to productivity are referred
to as Pay for Performance, and there exists a substantial literature on the merits and demerits of such
mechanisms (see Prendergast, 1999; Ariely et al., 2009; Lazear, 2000; Lazear, 1986; Gibbons, 1987).
There are a significant number of empirical studies on the effect of piece rate Pay for Performance
mechanisms on worker effort. The main conditions for piece rates to be beneficial are low monitoring
costs, accurate output measures, and heterogeneous ability amongst workers (Lazear, 1986). Freeman
(1998) finds that a US shoe manufacturing firm, which switched from a piece rate payments to a rate per
hour, increased profits by eliminating monitoring costs. He concludes that, when monitoring costs are
high, piece rates may not always be the optimal payment method even if they do increase worker produc-
tivity. Conversely, Lazear (2000) analysed field data from an automotive glass installer which switched
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from an hourly payment regime to piece rate payment, finding a 44% increase in productivity under piece
rates comparative to rate per hour (although half of this gain was found to be due to worker sorting). In
this circumstance both wages and profit increased. This efficiency gain was largely due to a sophisticated
computerised system that allowed the firm to directly measure productivity. Similarly, Paarsch (1996)
finds that tree planters in British Columbia are more productive if paid piece rates comparative to fixed
wages, although in this case all efficiency gains are attributed to increased effort, as there is no sorting
effect. In a more recent experiment, Bandiera et al. (2005) compare a piece rate payment with a relative
payment, where workers are paid according to their output comparative to the mean output that day;
the authors find that piece rates lead to higher productivity.
A stream of the literature examines the impact on performance pay on educational outcomes. Lavy
(2002) examines the effect of performance-based reward structure in a non-random sample of schools in
Israel. He finds that providing both students and teachers with monetary incentives has a positive impact
on student performance; positive results are also found where only teachers are incentivised, which proves
more cost effective. Similarly, Muralidharan & Sundararaman (2009) find a positive and significant im-
pact of providing performance-based incentives to teachers on student performance. Fryer et al. (2012)
examine the effect of loss aversion on teachers, by paying teachers an advance for achieving a target
student performance, and asking them to return the money if this is not fulfilled. The authors identify
an increased students performance on a standardised maths test.
In general, the literature concludes that Pay for Performance mechanisms lead to increased produc-
tivity in most circumstances. This result can, however, be reversed where incentive payments are set at
a sufficiently high rate such that workers can achieve their target wage with minimal effort (Ariely et
al., 2009). However Bandiera, Barankay, & Rasul (2005) evaluate the piece rate payment comparative to
relative incentives in a field experiment, and find no evidence of income targeting.
Although the literature shows that in most cases Pay for Performance mechanisms increase worker
productivity, surprisingly little attention has been paid to pay per performance mechanisms that involve
risk. This is perhaps surprising; as Zabojnik (2002) notes, this has direct relevance to industries in which
bonuses are paid in share options. Further, recent research shows some suggestive evidence that such
contracts might deliver greater efficiency gains than piece rates.
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Zabojnik (2002) shows that if the assumption of global risk-averseness on the part of workers is
dropped, and a Friedman-Savage quasi-convex utility function is instead assumed with respect to wages,
the first best contract achieving full efficiency in a principal-agent setup is achieved using lottery pay-
ments. It is shown that in a locally convex section of the workers utility function there exists a lottery
payment with an expected wage lower than a fixed wage achieving the same worker utility.
Brune (2015) builds on this hypothesis by comparing the effect of a lottery bonus to a piece rate bonus
with the same expected value on productivity and attendance of workers at a large agricultural firm in
Malawi. The study finds a statistically significant increase in labour supply by workers at the intensive
margin twice as large as that for piece rates. A small and marginally significant (at 10% level) increase
in productivity is identified for the lottery bonus, though the piece rate bonus was not statistically dif-
ferent from the baseline. However notably this result could conceivably be dampened by worker fatigue:
because workers are working more at the intensive margin, the effects of fatigue could conceivably reduce
the treatment effect with respect to productivity (e.g. see Schor, 1991). There is clearly therefore scope
for an experiment in which a productivity outcome alone is incentivised.
Levitt et al. (2016) examines the effect of financial incentives on student performance, comparing
a fixed conditional transfer payment to a lottery payment, and with varied treatments in which both
students and parents are incentivised. The authors find that a lottery payment with parents as recipients
was most effective, whilst a small but significant effect for a fixed payment with students as the recipients
is also identified.
Another stream of literature focuses on lottery payments for micro tasks. These are the papers most
related to ours, although we will contribute with a real effort task in a lab setting. Rula et al. (2014)
compare outcomes using piece rate micro-payments and a lottery, where the payments were in the form
of coffee shop gift cards. They obtain that piece rates had higher compliance and user effort, while the
lottery treatment achieved higher recruitment. However there is the clear potential for these results to
be driven by self-selection and heterogeneous preferences over the gift cards. Similarly, Rokicki et al.
(2014) compare outcomes under competitive payments, piece rates, and lottery payments in Amazon
Mechanical Turk. They obtained that an exponential piece rate payment outperforms a winner-takes-it
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all piece rate and lottery based payments in terms of accuracy, although the authors point out these
results have potential to be driven by the relatively low value of rewards in the lottery treatment.
Celis et al. (2013) similarly compare a piece rate with a lottery payment for micro tasks in Amazon
Mechanical Turk, where participants were tasked with the digitalisation of pieces of scrambled text. They
find that lottery based payments lead to more accurate digitalisation, and workers spent more time on
these tasks. Furthermore, a third of participants reported to prefer the lottery payment comparative to
the piece rate.
Our paper attempts to clearly test the effects of a lottery setting in workers productivity via a real
effort task, and contribute to the literature on financial incentives on productivity, more concretely build
on the aforementioned small stream of the literature on incentives involving risk.
3.3 Experimental design
This experiment was conducted in the experimental lab at Royal Holloway, University of London
between 29th November and 5th December 2017. Subjects were recruited from various undergraduate
programmes at the university, including the Economics and Psychology programmes. Each session con-
sisted on a single treatment, and lasted around one hour. Subjects were paid a show up fee of £4.
The task conducted is the Slider Task developed by Gill and Prowse (2012a), using zTree software
(Fischbacher, 2007). This task was chosen for most direct comparability of results with other real-effort
tasks in the recent experimental literature (e.g. Gill & Prowse, 2012; Gill, Prowse and Vlassopoulos,
2013; Doerrenberg & Duncan, 2014; Gill and Prowse, 2014; Abeler & Jager, 2015; Georganas, Tonin,
& Vlassopoulos, 2015; Araujo et al, 2016; Buser & Dreber, 2016). The task was also chosen due to
its advantages over other classic real effort tasks: it is simple to understand and communicate; unlike
other tasks, the slider is exactly the same through repetitions; it involves little randomness and there is
no scope for guessing. Also, there is a strong correlation between effort and productivity. The primary
disadvantage of the slider task is that productivity is often found to be very tightly distributed, the lack
of variation making significant results difficult to identify (Banuri & Keefer, 2015). This does, however,
add power to significant results where they are identified.
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At the beginning of each session, subjects were allowed into the lab in groups of five and each subject
was randomly allocated to a workstation. Subjects were given around 15 minutes to read the task in-
structions fully and answer the control questions. Once finished, subjects control questions were checked
individually to ensure complete understanding of the task, and any doubts were clarified. A verbal sum-
mary of the instructions was then read to the entire group.
This real effort task consists of a screen with 51 sliders, all initially positioned at 0. Participants were
tasked with dragging each slider to position 50 with their mouse; the slider could be adjusted to any
position between 0 and 100, as many times as desired. The goal of the task is to correctly position as
many sliders as possible at 50 within an allotted time of two minutes. Subjects could see a running total
of correct sliders achieved in the current round, and the remaining time available. Five paid rounds were
conducted for each treatment.
At the beginning of each treatment, subjects were assigned a subject number and randomly allocated
into groups of five. Grouping subjects was necessary in order to identify peer effects. Each treatment
consisted of 50 subjects.
All communication subjects received about their group members was provided in terms of subject
numbers, thus keeping real identities anonymous. Two practice rounds were conducted prior to the paid
rounds in order to familiarise subjects with the task; subjects performance in these rounds did not affect
the final payoff.
Our three treatments differed only in terms of the bonus payoff mechanism. In each, for achieving a
minimum threshold of 15 correctly positioned sliders, subjects received a fixed payoff of 10 ECU (experi-
mental currency units). The payoffs for each round were independent, and the subjects received feedback
on their own performance and the performance of the other members of their group at the end of each
round.
In the piece rate treatment, each correctly positioned slider over and above the minimum threshold
of 15 earned the subject a 1 ECU bonus. Each ECU is equivalent to £0.30. The individuals payoff can
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be expressed as follows:
Where piir is the payment for subject i in round r, and Nir is the corresponding amount of correctly
positioned sliders.
In the Individual lottery treatment, each correct slider over and above the minimum threshold added
5 ECU to the subjects bonus pool; at the end of each round the subject received the bonus pool with
probability 1/5.
The individuals expected payoff can be described as follows:
In the group Lottery treatment, each correctly positioned slider over and above the minimum threshold
earned the subject 1 lottery ticket with a face value of 1 ECU. At the end of each round, all lottery tickets
in each group were added into a group bonus pool. The computer randomly selected one ticket in every
group, and the winner earned the whole bonus pool. Hence, there was one winner of the entire bonus pool
in each group per round. As before, earnings in one round did not affect the earnings in the following
rounds.
The individuals expected payoff can be described as follows:
As is demonstrated above, each individual is expected payoff pi for a given number of correctly posi-
tioned sliders in round r, E(piir) is constant across treatments; behavioural differences across treatments
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are therefore interpretable as a treatment effect of the compensation mechanism alone.
There was a 35 second pause in between each round, during which time subjects received feedback on
the number of sliders achieved by themselves and their group members. They also received their personal
payoff information, and that of other members of their group (including the winner in the case of the
group lottery).
At the end of each session, participants were asked to complete a short questionnaire, Including mea-
sure of risk preferences as per Holt and Laury (2002), an social peferences as per Bartling et al. (2009)1 .
Choices in the questionnaire were not monetarily incentivised. All subjects were paid in cash at the end
of every session.
3.4 Hypotheses
3.4.1 Risk preferences
Consider the first piece rate treatment. If we assume that the effort is highly correlated with the out-
put, there is no risk involved in the task. Hence, we can assume that a risk neutral individual will perfom
similarly to a risk loving and a risk averse one, taking into account their own preferences and cost of effort.
Hypothesis 1: In the piece rate treatment, three subjects that only differ in their risk preferences, these
being risk neutral, risk loving and risk averse, will exert the same ammount of effort.
In the inidividual lottery treatment, subjects percieve the total bonus with a probability, where the
expected payoff of every extra unit is the same as in the piece rate.
Hypothesis 2: In the individual lottery treatment, a risk neutral individual will exert an equal amount
of effort as in the piece rate treatment, a risk loving individual will exert more, and a risk averse individ-
ual will exert less.
In the group lottery, the expected payoff of an aditional unit will depend on the performance of other
1See appendix 2
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subjects in the group as well as the subject’s own productivity. If we consider this as an additional layer
of risk, we expect risk averse subjects to exert less effort than in the two previous treatments and risk
loving sujects to exert more.
Hypothesis 3: In the group lottery treatment, a risk neutral individual will exert an equal amount of
effort as in the piece rate and the individual lottery treatment, a risk loving individual will exert more
effort than in two other treatments, and a risk averse individual will exert less.
3.4.2 Social preferences
We measure social preferences in terms of prosociality and envy. Since in the first two treatments
one subject action’s wont affect the other’s payoffs, we expect social preferences to have no effect on the
productivity.
Now consider the group lottery treatment; an increase in a subject’s effort increases its own relative
chance of winning and drecreases the other subjects’ chance of winning. At the same time, it increases
the total prize that another subject may get if she is not chosen as winner. Hence, we need to make some
assumption about what subjects care about. Subjects may only care about expected individual utility;
in this case, a procosocial subject may want to decrease her effort in order to increase the relative chance
of winning of the other subjects, while an envious subject will want to increase her effort.
Alternatively, it seems reasonable to assume that subjects may only care about the total utility, which
will be measured as the total prize. In this case, a prosocial subject may want to increase her effort and
hence increase the total prize, regardless of individual winning chances. Contrarily, an envious subject
may want to decrease the total prize, and a decrease in her winning chanes is the paid price.
Hypothesis 4: If a subject cares about individual utility, prosociality preferences will decrease subject’s
incentives to exert effort, while envy preferences will increase them.
Hypothesis 5: If a subject cares about total utility, prosocial preferences will increase subject’s incen-
tives to exert effort, while envy preferences will decrease it.
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3.4.3 Other
Subjects in our three treatments observe their group’s effort in the previous round. Now, how this will
affect performance will depend on whether subejct’s expected payoff is affected by other’s performance.
In the piece rate treatment and in the individual lottery, expected payoff is not affected by others’s
performance, and since it seems reasonable to assume that subjects do not want to perform worse than
others, we expect previous observed effort positively affect subject’s effort in the current period.
Hypothesis 6: Observed previous group performance will increase effort in the previous period for sub-
jects in the piece rate treatment.
Hypothesis 7: Observed previous group performance will increase effort in the previous period for sub-
jects in the individual lottery treatment.
In the group lottery treatment subject’s payoff is affected by other’s performance. How this will affect
performance is not straigthforward. Again, an individual that cares about the individual utility may
perceive previous group effort as a decrease in own’s chances of winning, while an individual that cares
about total utility may perceive previous group effort as an increase of the prize in the event of winning.
Hypothesis 8: If individuals care about expected utility, observed group effort will have a negative
impact on current performance Alternatively, if individuals care about total utility, observed group effort
will have a positive impact on currect effort.
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3.5 Results
Table 1
Figure 1
Figure 1 compares productivity in each treatment and its evolution over time; Table 1 shows the
corresponding mean productivity for each treatment in each time period, and the associated standard
deviations. The group lottery is uniformly more productive than piece rates (though it is shown below
that we cannot reject the null that the two series are equal); productivity in the group lottery is uniformly
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more widely distributed than piece rates. Both the group lottery and piece rate productivity trends are
concave, indicative of a decrease in the rate of learning over time, and/or fatigue. Participants in the
individual lottery are at least as productive as the group lottery with the exception of Period 3.
We first conduct Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Mann-Whitney non-parametric tests on data aggregated
at the group level for each period to test the null hypothesis that group productivity in both lottery
treatments are drawn from the same distribution as the piece rate treatment. The p-values generated are
presented in Table 1.
Productivity in the group lottery is consistently slightly above, but not to be significantly different
from piece rates in both non-parametric tests when observations are pooled by group. Productivity dif-
ferentials are globally larger for the individual lottery, but the null hypothesis of no effect cannot be
rejected for any period.
Table 2
It should be noted that an established characteristic of the slider task is that variation in productivity is
typically very tightly distributed, such that significant results are hard to identify (e.g. Banuri & Keefer, 2015);
this problem is compounded by the within-group variation lost when pooling across groups.
In the ensuing analysis we therefore further employ various parametric specifications at the individual level to
establish the extent to which the lack of statistical significance in the non-parametric tests may be driven by this
uncaptured variation; this also allows for the inclusion of relevant covariates to disseminate the factors driving
the outcomes.
We first estimate the treatment effect by estimating iterations of Equation 1 by OLS. Yit is output (or equiv-
alently effort) by individual i in period t. is a continuous measure for time, measured in periods such that
τ ∈ R[1, 5]; τ2 is specified to capture concavity. TLi is a set of treatment dummies, where L = (1, 2, 3) for piece
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rate, individual lottery, and group lottery treatments respectively. βˆ2, therefore, estimates the Average Treatment
Effect (ATE) on the Y intercept for the individual lottery, and βˆ3 for the group lottery, comparative to the piece
rate baseline. γˆ2 and γˆ3 respectively identify the impact of individual and group lotteries in productivity growth
over time. Y¯ −igi(t−1)) measures a one-period lag of mean productivity of individual is group members, excluding
individual i; δL therefore estimates at the margin the impact of higher group productivity on individual is pro-
ductivity in the following period, for each treatment (including the piece rate baseline).
Despite random allocation of subjects to each treatment, we find some heterogeneity in key characteristics
that have a theoretical effect on productivity or response to treatment (see Table 3). For instance, 50% of subjects
in the individual lottery are male, as opposed to 30% in the piece rate treatment, and 38% in the group lottery;
individual lottery subjects spent nearly twice as many hours playing video games as in the other treatments,
and prosocial preferences are significantly more prevalent for piece rate subjects. As such we include two ad-
ditional specifications controlling for explanatory variables to account for this between-treatment heterogeneity.
Ri ∈ R[0, 10] is a continuous measure of risk aversion as per Holt and Laury (2002), such that preferences for risk
are increasing in Ri; θˆL therefore estimates the marginal increase in productivity resultant of a one unit increase
in preferences for risky gambles, again for each treatment. Si is a matrix of social preference dummies for revealed
social preferences for group envy and pro-sociality, for each individual i; is therefore a vector of estimators of the
impact of each social preference classification on productivity, estimated separately for each treatment (including
the piece rates). Xi is a (k N) matrix of k explanatory covariates, consisting of a sex dummy, dummies indicating
whether the subject is reading Psychology or Economics, and the (self-reported) mean number of hours the sub-
ject spends playing video games. ˆit is a residual error term, assumed to be mean zero and normally distributed.
Results are presented in Table 4.
Equation 1
23
Table 3
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Table 4. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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In specification (1) we estimate Equation 1 without covariates to establish raw differentials; similarly
to the non-parametric specifications presented above, there is no statistically significant productivity dif-
ference between either lottery treatment and the piece rate. Though not significantly different from zero,
point estimates for β1 and β2 and small and positive. This confutes the standard theoretical predictions
discussed above: subjects are not found to be adversely disincentivised by risky incentives comparative
to a riskless incentive with comparative expected value.
We therefore disseminate the behavioural factors driving this result. Firstly we add the lagged term
Y¯ −igi(t−1)) to the raw differential estimation in specification (2)
2. A large and significant (at 1% level)
marginal impact of other group members productivity in the previous period is identified for the piece rate
treatment, and a negative effect of similar magnitude is identified for the group lottery; point estimates
of the effect of the individual lottery are close to zero and not statistically significant. Without controls,
specification (2) identifies a significant (at 5% level) increase in productivity growth of 1.37 in the group
lottery comparative to piece rates over time; a smaller positive (though not significant) difference in
productivity growth is identified for the individual lottery. The point estimate for the group lottery ATE
becomes very large and significant in (2), though this disappears when control is added, indicative of
omitted variable bias in (2).
Specification (3) adds controls for risk preferences (interacted with each treatment), sex, number of
weekly hours spent playing video games, and dummies for students reading Economics and Psychology
respectively. More risk-seeking subjects are found to be less productive in the piece rate treatment (signif-
icant at 1%); coefficients are positive for both group lotteries but are not significantly different from zero.
Males are found to be more productive than females, and psychology students are found to be much less
productive than other subjects (both significant at 1%); hours reported spent playing video games has a
small positive impact on productivity. Notably, the point estimate on the group lottery ATE returns to
being small and insignificant when control is added, though the productivity growth differential between
the group lottery and piece rates remains of similar magnitude to (2).
2Inclusion of lags does introduce serial autocorrelation (as measured by the Wooldridge Test), hence reporting of robust
standard errors. Assumed strict exogeneity in OLS estimation requires that each regressor is orthogonal to the error term
for all observations for coefficient estimates to be unbiased; whilst there is clearly a correlation between prior performance
of other group members and current performance for subject i, this correlation is of small magnitude and there is no reason
to assume is is systematically correlated with current period error. In fact, specification of regressors correlated with lags
of the dependent variable are commonly employed as instruments, e.g. Arellano & Bond (1991).
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Specification (4) controls for social preferences, as measured by Bartling et al., (2009), with dummies
for envy, costly envy, pro-sociality, and costly pro-sociality interacted with each treatment. Costly envy
is found to have a large positive (significant at 1%) impact on productivity for piece rates, and a large
negative (though only significant at 10%) productivity impact for the group lottery. Envy is found to
have a large negative (significant at 1%) impact on productivity in the piece rate treatment, whilst costly
envy is found to have a positive effect (significant at 5%) on piece rate productivity. ATE estimates
for both lottery treatments remain small and insignificant; the productivity growth estimate remains of
similar magnitude and significant at 5% for the group lottery comparative to piece rates. The coefficient
for individual lottery productivity growth comparative to piece rates becomes (just) significant at the
10% level, while the coefficient for group lottery growth remains positive and significant at the 5% level.
For robustness, we re-estimate Equation 1 using cluster-robust standard errors to account for het-
eroskedasticity specifically arising from heterogeneous within-group or between-group variances, which
one might reasonably assume arise from individual heterogeneity in response to treatment, or at the group
level due to peer effects. Results with standard errors clustered at the individual level are presented in
Table 5, and at the group level in Table 6. Point estimates (by definition) are unchanged in both specifi-
cations, however growth estimates for the individual lottery comparative to piece rates become significant
at the 5% level with individual level clustering, and 1% level with group level clustering, for all covariate
specifications.
Caution should, however, be exercised in interpreting the z-statistics in Table 6 (group-level cluster-
ing); there exists potential for downward bias in clustered standard error estimates where the number
of clusters is finite, thus inflating z-statistics. Rogers (1993) finds this bias is negligible so long as no
single cluster contains more than 5% of observations in the population (each of ours contain exactly 5%),
however Kzdi (2004) argues there must be at least fifty clusters in a sample for clustered standard errors
to be unbiased (comparative to our thirty).
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Table 5. Cluster-robust (individual level) standard errors in parentheses *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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Table 6. Cluster-robust (group level) standard errors in parentheses *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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The most notable difference when clustering the errors is that the slope effect for the individual lottery
becomes significant (at the 5% level for individual-level clustering, and 1% level for group-level cluster-
ing) for specifications (2)-(4), though it remains smaller than the growth for the group lottery. Hence
we conclude that, although there is no difference in the ATE for the lottery treatments compared to the
piece treatment, the productivity growth over time is larger in the lottery treatments compared to the
piece rate treatment.
3.6 Discussion
Contrary to the standard theoretical prediction that subjects will exert less effort where incentives
involve risk comparative to riskless incentives, our experiment shows that lottery incentives perform at
least as well as piece rates in inducing effort, with some suggestive evidence that a group lottery out-
performs piece rates in terms of evolution of productivity over time. Productivity growth in the group
lottery setting is higher than in the piece rate setting when controlling for observables. This is consistent
with the findings obtained by Celis et al. (2013), Rula et al. (2014), Rokicki et al. (2014), and Levitt
et al. (2016), where lottery incentives are found to have a positive effect on outcomes comparative to
riskless alternatives.
Contrary to the theoretical suggestions in Zabojnik (2012), in which a quasi-convex utility is assumed
on the part of the agent to assert that lottery contracts perform better because of a risk-seeking element
in the locally convex portion of the workers utility function, we do not find that risk-seeking preferences
significantly drive performance in the lottery treatments. We do, however, find that more risk-seeking
agents perform slightly (but signifcant to 1% level) worse in the piece rate treatment comparative to
their peers. This is in line with our hypothesis 1, 2 and 3. More risk loving individuals perform better in
riskier scenarios, which is also consistent with standard theory.
The prior effort of other group members is positively related to current period effort in the piece rate
treatment, which is compatible with out hypothesis 6. This is also conceptually compatible with peer
effects, where there is an imitation effect, or an increase of optimism, arising where a subject observes her
peers performing well. This is also explainable by competition effects, where the subjects may conceivably
seek to retain or improve their group ranking. Notheless, the effect for the group lottery treatment is
30
not signifficant, which contradicts our hypothesis 7. This could be due to the fact that, due to the risky
nature of the payoff structure, higher effort does not necessarily correspond with higher payoff, hence risk
aversion counteracts this peer effect.
Contrary to hypothesis 4, we find that those with prosocial preferences are significantly more pro-
ductive than their peers in the piece rate treatment; productivity coefficients for pro-social prefererence
dummies are also positive, though neither effect is found to be statistcially different from zero. We
propose that the positive pro-sociality coefficient in the piece rate treatment is in fact due to pro-social
subjects being incentivised by an equitable distribution of payoffs, which arguably characterises the piece
rate payment mechanism.
The converse effect is observed in the group lottery treatment, where the prior effort of other group
members has a negative effect on current worker effort, which is compatible with our hypothesis 7. No-
tably here the total bonus pool in any given period is positively related to other group members effort,
though the probability of winning is negatively related to other group members effort. This is indicative
of the workers effort being more strongly incentivised by the probability of winning than the size of the
total prize, which is compatible with hypothesis 7, meaning that individuals care mainly about their own
individual expected payoff.
Our results must then be driven by the presence of an element that is only present in the lottery
treatments, and more so in the group lottery. Since preferences do not seem to be driving the difference,
we propose that it is the observation of someone winning a prize the incentive that is provoking a growth
in performance that is higher for the lottery treatments. For the case of the group lottery, this effect pulls
the productivity up, compensating for the effects that pull it down, as it is risk aversion and observing
other groupmates effort in the case of the group lottery.
3.7 Conclusion
Although standard theory posits that subjects should optimally exert less effort where incentives in-
volve risk, we find that people perform at least as well with a lottery incentive comparative to piece rates
with equivalent expected values, with some suggestive evidence that productivity growth over time is
higher in a group lottery.
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We disentangle the driving factors behind the overall effect, finding that risk-seeking behaviour has
surprisingly little explanatory power on lottery productivity. Peer effects are found to be negative in the
group lottery, but positive under piece rates, though positive peer effects in the piece rate treatment are
countered by significantly worse productivity by risk-averse subjects.
We propose this result is driven by lottery treatment subjects observance of one of their peers subject
obtaining a prize. Conceivably, if a subjects desire to win a prize increases after observing a peer within
their group group winning a prize, this provides incentive to learn, thus increasing growth in effort over
time. Nonetheless, the mechanism between increased learning in the lottery settings and inequality aver-
sion is not clear, and there is scope for further this field that directly tests for this relationship, as well as
the effects of competition in repeated games. It is further possible that an adaptation of this experiment
with a higher number of rounds would find a larger and statistically significant treatment effect, as an
increased rate of learning increases the point difference in productivity over time.
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3.9 Appendix 1: Experimental instructions
PIECE RATE TREATMENT
Welcome to the experiment!
You are about to take part in a study on economic decision-making. The study will last about one
hour. We are very grateful for your participation. You will be paid a guaranteed show-up fee of £4 for
participating in the experiment. This is independent of your actions during the experiment. You will also
have the opportunity to earn additional money. The final amount you earn will depend on your actions.
THE TASK
In each round, you will see 48 sliders on the screen.
Your task is to set the position of each slider to the centre. Each slider is initially positioned at 0 and
your task is to set as many sliders as possible to 50.
You have 3 minutes to set as many sliders as possible to 50.
Each slider has a number to its right showing its current position. You should use your mouse to
move each slider. You can readjust the position of each slider as many times as you wish. If you click on
the slider, it will jump, hence it needs to be dragged.
At the top of the screen you see the time remaining and your points score in the task so far.
EARNINGS
Your payment in each round depends on the number of sliders you positioned. If you position 10 or more
sliders at 50, you will receive a fixed payment of £0.60 per round. If you correctly position less than 10
sliders, you will not receive any payment for that round (save for the show-up fee).
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After you correctly position 15 sliders, each extra correctly positioned slider will pay you an additional
bonus of £0.06 each.
Therefore, if you position at least 10 sliders correctly in all rounds, you can earn a total fixed pay of £3
(5 * £0.60) plus your bonus in each round.
ROUNDS
You will play 5 rounds of this task. Before these commence, you will have 2 additional practice rounds
that will allow you to familiarise yourself with the task. Your performance in the practice rounds will
not influence your final payoff.
Please raise your hand if you have any questions.
INDIVIDUAL LOTTERY TREATMENT
Welcome to the experiment!
You are about to take part in a study on economic decision-making. The study will last about one
hour. We are very grateful for your participation. You will be paid a guaranteed show-up fee of £4 for
participating in the experiment. This is independent of your actions during the experiment. You will also
have the opportunity to earn additional money. The final amount you earn will depend on your actions.
THE TASK
In each round, you will see 48 sliders on the screen.
Your task is to set the position of each slider to the centre. Each slider is initially positioned at 0 and
your task is to set as many sliders as possible to 50.
You have 3 minutes to set as many sliders as possible to 50.
Each slider has a number to its right showing its current position. You should use your mouse to
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move each slider. You can readjust the position of each slider as many times as you wish. If you click on
the slider, it will jump, hence it needs to be dragged.
At the top of the screen you see the time remaining and your points score in the task so far.
EARNINGS
Your payment in each round depends on the number of sliders you positioned. If you position 10 or
more sliders at 50, you will receive a fixed pay of £0.60 per round. If you correctly position less than 10
sliders, you will not receive any payment for that round (save for the show-up fee).
After you correctly position 15 sliders, each extra correctly positioned slider add £0.30 to your bonus
pool. At the end of each round, you may receive this bonus pool, with 20% probability.
Therefore, if you position at least 10 sliders correctly in all rounds, you can earn a total fixed pay of
£3 (5 * £0.6) plus your bonus in each round.
ROUNDS
You will play 5 rounds of this task. Before these commence, you will have 2 additional practice rounds
that will allow you to familiarise yourself with the task. Your performance in the practice rounds will
not influence your final payoff.
Please raise your hand if you have any questions.
GROUP LOTTERY TREATMENT
Welcome to the experiment!
You are about to take part in a study on economic decision-making. The study will last about one
hour. We are very grateful for your participation. You will be paid a guaranteed show-up fee of £4 for
participating in the experiment. This is independent of your actions during the experiment. You will also
have the opportunity to earn additional money. The final amount you earn will depend on your actions.
THE TASK
In each round, you will see 48 sliders on the screen.
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Your task is to set the position of each slider to the centre. Each slider is initially positioned at 0 and
your task is to set as many sliders as possible to 50.
You have 3 minutes to set as many sliders as possible to 50.
Each slider has a number to its right showing its current position. You should use your mouse to
move each slider. You can readjust the position of each slider as many times as you wish. If you click on
the slider, it will jump, hence it needs to be dragged.
At the top of the screen you see the time remaining and your points score in the task so far.
EARNINGS
You will be working in a fixed group of 5 people.
Your payment in each round depends on the number of sliders you positioned. If you position 10 or
more sliders at 50, you will receive a fixed payment of £0.60 per round. If you correctly position less
than 10 sliders, you will not receive any payment.
After you correctly position 10 sliders, each extra correctly positioned slider will add £0.06 to the
group bonus pool, and earn you a lottery ticket to win the entire pool. At the end of each round, one of
the lottery tickets will be selected, and its owner will earn the total prize. Note that more lottery tickets
implies a higher chance of winning the total prize.
Thus, if you position at least 15 sliders correctly in all rounds, you can earn a total fixed pay of £3
(5 * £0.60) plus your lottery earnings in each round.
ROUNDS
You will play 5 rounds of this task. Before these commence, you will have 2 additional practice rounds
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that will allow you to familiarise yourself with the task. Your performance in the practice rounds will
not influence your final payoff.
Please raise your hand if you have any questions.
3.10 Appendix 2: Social preferences eliciation game
We use the social preference game developed in Bartling et al., 2009. Our participants are asked to
imagine a hypothetical scenario where they are allocated with another another anonymous participant,
and have to choose between two binary allocations for each social preference principle. The first allocation
corresponds to an egalitarian distrbibution in all games, while the second allocation favours the decision
maker (other participant) in the prosociality (envy) and costly prosociality (costly envy) game.
All payoffs are in pounds.
For our results, we consider the four principle variables as dummies that take value 1 when the first
allocation is selected, and 0 when the second allocation is selected.
This task is not monetarily incentivised.
3.11 Appendix 3: Risk Preferences elicitation
We use the task developed by Holt and Laury (2002) and measure it as the selected amount of non safe
options, hence a higher coefficient indicates a higher risk loving preference. This task is not monetarily
incentivised.
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4 CHAPTER 2
Cheating, incentives, and money manipula-
tion
With Gary Charness 1, Lara Ezquerra, 2 Ismael Rodriguez-Lara3
2Department of Economics, University of California, Santa Barbara
3Department of Business and Economics, University of the Balearic Islands
4Department of Economics, Middlesex University London
4.1 Introduction
Many economic interactions require that individuals disclose information that they possess. Examples
include a car dealer selling a used car, a broker giving advice on the best mortgage, or a professor writing
a reference letter for a student or a colleague. In all these environments with asymmetric information,
it may be socially-optimal for individuals to reveal their information truthfully. However, economic and
personal incentives may lead people to deliberately misreport such information. One may shade the truth
(so common in reference letters as to be the norm) or simply prevaricate. Such dishonesty is a form of
cheating behavior, a term that also includes activities such as theft, embezzlement, and bribery.
There are noteworthy economic consequences associated with cheating behavior. Indeed, Cohn, Fehr
and Marchal (2014) point to cheating in the business culture as a force that is plausibly responsible
(at least in part) for the all-too-common scandals in business and politics. Tax evasion and avoidance
led to diminished tax revenue of approximately 1 trillion in the Eurozone, according to the European
Commission, and the IRS estimates the overall tax gap in the U.S represents about 16 percent of the
estimated actual tax liability. In the developing world, corruption and cheating are quite prevalent; nu-
merous dictators (e.g., Suharto, Marcos, and Duvalier) have shamelessly looted their countries, which
have suffered greatly after the fall of the dictatorship; such corruption hinders investment and growth.
In addition, recent experimental evidence has demonstrated that setting goals (Schweitzer, Ordez and
Douma, 2004) or using policies such as team incentives (Conrads et al., 2013), random bonuses (Gill ,
Prowse and Vlassopoulos, 2013), or performance-based bonuses (Jacob and Levitt, 2003; Martinelli et
al., 2017) can exacerbate cheating behavior.
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In this paper, we study the effects of incentives on cheating behavior in both the loss and gain domains
when people are asked to reveal a piece of private information. This information concerns a state of the
world, whose report may only determine the payoff of the reporting agent. We focus on behavior when
the money to be received is framed alternatively as a gain or a loss. There is evidence that loss contracts
(i.e., up-front bonuses that workers can lose) increase workplace productivity (Brooks, Stremitzer and
Tontrup, 2012; Hossain and List, 2012; Fryer et al., 2012). Further, workers might prefer loss contracts as
a way to improve their performance and thus increase their expected earnings (Imas, Sadoff and Samek,
2016). However, Cameron and Miller (2009) and Grolleau, Kocher and Sutan (2016) find that subjects
cheat more in a loss frame when reporting their own performance on a real-effort task. Cameron, Miller
and Monin (2010) argue that paying people in advance for performing a task might induce a feeling of
entitlement, and this might facilitate or even encourage unethical behavior.
We investigate whether people cheat more in a loss frame when their private information concerns
the state of the world. Since a loss contract usually requires that people receive the money in advance,
we conducted treatments (in the gain and the loss frame) with and without money manipulation, as this
may affect the sense of ownership and what could be termed the moral cost of lying. This device helps
us to tease apart the effects of the frame and the manipulation of money on cheating behavior.
We consider an environment where the outcome is independent of ones level of talent or ability, so that
there should in principle be no measure of ones worth attached to the report (of course considerations of
self-image and social image may still affect the reports). We use a variant of the seminal design developed
by Fischbacher and Fllmi-Heusi (2013). Each participant is asked to privately roll a die (6-sided in the
original experiment, 10-sided in ours), so that the experimenter cannot determine the veracity of the
subsequent report 3. The beauty of this design is that while the experimenter cannot know whether an
individual is lying, statistical tests on the aggregate data show the extent to which the experimental
population distorts the truth. Standard economic models predict that people will cheat in the absence
of punishment when there is incentive to do so, but will otherwise be indifferent regarding telling the truth.
3We use a 10-sided die to increase the number of possible outcomes. Studies by, e.g., Greene and Paxton (2009), Hao
and Houser (2010), Shalvi et al. (2011), Conrads et al. (2013), Gravert (2013), Jiang (2013) and Ploner and Regner (2013)
have also used the die-rolling task. See Abeler, Nosenzo and Raymond (2016) for a recent meta-study. Other studies have
used the sender-receiver game where cheating is strategic (i.e., the sender needs to send a message to the receiver about the
real state of the world and the receiver may believe it or not). This includes, among others, Gneezy (2005), Sutter (2009),
Lundquist et al. (2009), Erat and Gneezy (2012), Erat (2013) and Vanberg (2015).
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We first compare behavior in a Baseline treatment where subjects receive a fixed amount regardless of
their report with the behavior of people when their financial payoff depends on the reported outcome. To
our knowledge, this is the first paper that directly tests whether subjects lie in the absence of incentives
when their behavior does not impose any payoff externality on others. We then proceed to examine
behavior in the loss and the gain domains, since the notion of loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky,
1979) is so pervasive. In our standard treatments, we give subjects their earnings in a closed envelope
at the end of the session, but we change the reference point. In the gain setting, the reported number
determines the amount to be placed (by the experimenter) into the envelope, while in the loss setting
all envelopes contain the maximum possible earnings and we subtract an amount that depends on the
reported number. Arguably, loss aversion would predict more cheating with the loss framing, since giving
up money would seem to be more unpleasant than simply not receiving money4. Finally, having observed
our results in these treatments, we implemented treatments in which the participants either took their
earnings from an envelope (gain treatment) or put money into an envelope after having received the
maximum possible payoff at the beginning of the session (loss treatment).
How would loss aversion actually apply in a cheating environment? As mentioned above, Cameron
and Miller (2009), Cameron, Miller and Monin (2010) and Grolleau, Kocher and Sutan (2016) observe
that loss aversion encourages cheating in real-effort tasks. Their tasks differ from ours in that one would
expect more concern about ones social image when ones ability (or honor) is at stake. Previous exper-
imental evidence (e.g., Ertac, 2011; Charness, Rustichini, and van de Ven, 2013) shows that people are
much less accurate in processing information when this information is self-relevant than when it concerns
an outcome that is unaffected by ones level of talent. Thus, we might expect more cheating in a self-
relevant performance task than in our task (Gravert, 2013).
The closest paper to ours is Schindler and Pfattheicher (2017). They ask subjects to roll a 6-sided die
75 times and then report the number of 4s they have obtained. While subjects report more 4s in the loss
frame, the authors find no evidence of cheating in the gain frame, contrary to other experimental evidence
(Abeler, Nosenzo and Raymond, 2016). Another salient difference between our designs is that we ask
4Garbarino, Slonim, and Villeval (2016) derive a prediction that people will lie more frequently when the probability of
a (the) bad outcome is lower, since the higher expected payoff means that the loss avoided by lying compared to reference
point is greater. They find support from an analysis of studies in the literature as well as new experiments. See also Abeler,
Nosenzo and Raymond (2016) and Gneezy, Kajackaite and Sobel (2016) for other experiments that vary the probability of
a (the) bad outcome.
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subjects to report the outcome of a die roll, while the multiple die rolls in Schindler and Pfattheicher
(2017) allows subjects to cheat more than once (see also Shalvi et al. 2011, Fischbacher and Fllmi-Heusi
2013)5. In addition, we complement their findings by looking at the moral costs and the effects of money
manipulation on the reported outcomes.
We expect that moral concerns and social norms will interact with the motivation to cheat. With the
mounting evidence on cheating behavior, some recent models include a term for the moral cost of lying
but restrict this to be a function of the distance between the material payoff from cheating and that from
not cheating (e.g., Lundquist et al.; 2009, Garbarino, Slonim, and Villeval, 2016). However, it is likely
that other elements should be present in the arguments of a function reflecting the moral cost of cheating.
For example, Utikal and Fischbacher (2013) find that nuns tend to under-report the die roll, perhaps
wishing to appear modest in their demands. Subjects also refrain from cheating when the opportunity
is made salient (Mazar, Amir and Ariely 2008; Gino, Ayal and Ariely 2009). The meta-study in Abeler,
Nosenzo and Raymond (2016) indeed concludes that the desire to appear honest may be a key driving
force in explaining cheating behavior in the die-rolling task6.
In our setting, if you are given money and hold it in your possession, you may feel that you have
been trusted (the mental-cheating condition could be seen as being a strong demand effect). Keeping the
money with which you have been entrusted may feel more like stealing than taking money that youve
been invited to take7. Trust and morality are important and people may be sensitive to small clues and
considerations (Mazar, Amir and Ariely, 2008). If one feels trusted, this could mean that one believes
that the trustor believes that the trustee will behave in a trustworthy manner. If one doesnt, then one
may experience guilt (Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006; Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007, 2009; Battigalli,
Charness, and Dufwenberg, 2013). We attempt to better understand the interplay between incentives to
cheat in the gain and loss domain and the moral costs of cheating.
In fact, some of our experimental results will surprise many readers. We do find evidence across many
5Schindler and Pfattheicher (2017) consider a second study in mTurk, where subjects self-report the outcome of tossing
a coin (Bucciol, and Piovesan, 2011). In this task, where cheating is a binary decision, Schindler and Pfattheicher (2017)
find that cheating occurs in both the gain and the loss frame, with more cheating being observed in the later.
6See also Rosenbaum, Billinge and Stieglitz (2014), Kajackaite and Gneezy (2017), Gneezy, Kajackaite and Sobel (2016),
and Dufwenberg and Dufwenberg (2016) for related evidence, and Mazar, Amir and Ariely (2008) for a theory of self-concept
maintenance.
7This resembles the idea of omission-commission in Spranca, Minsk and Baron (1991). However, participants in our
experiment are asked to enter the number they have obtained in the computer screen, thus cheating requires acts of
commission even in the loss condition (Cameron and Miller, 2009)
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of our treatments that cheating is more frequent when this affects the reporters material payoffs than
when it doesnt. However, in the standard treatments where participants simply receive their payoffs in
an envelope, we find no evidence of more cheating with a loss frame than with a gain frame. We felt that
two elements could have helped to induce this finding. First, reports are constrained to be one of the 10
possible outcomes of the die roll. If subjects cheat maximally in the gain treatment (given their moral
costs), one shall not observe more cheating in the loss frame. Second, the sense of ownership might have
been too weak in this design. We addressed these points by affecting the moral costs of cheating and
implement treatments in which the participants actually physically handle the money. Indeed, requiring
the participants to engage in money manipulation led to less cheating. To our surprise, however, we find
substantially less cheating in this loss treatment than in the corresponding gain treatment. In fact, there
is no significant difference between behavior in the baseline treatment and in the loss treatment with
money manipulation.
Thus, we find ourselves swimming upstream with our experimental results. We do interpret our re-
sults as reflecting differences in perceived trust and beliefs. We suspect that there were different moral
costs and beliefs in different treatments. Specifically, people in the money-manipulation loss treatment
might have been more likely to feel that they had been trusted with the full potential payoff in the
beginning and might have had different beliefs about the beliefs of the experimenter than people in the
corresponding gain treatment. Further, the decision to return money in the loss framing could be seen
as warm-glow giving (Andreoni, 1989, 1990), especially in the money-manipulation loss treatment, where
subjects had to place the amount to be returned in an envelope. Hence, it seems unrealistic to ignore the
psychological (moral) costs and benefits that are likely to be involved in deciding whether (and by how
much) to cheat.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We present the experimental design, implementa-
tion, and hypotheses in Section 2, and describe the experimental results in Section 3. We provide some
discussion and conclude in Section 4.
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4.2 Experimental Design and hypotheses
4.2.1 Experimetnal design
A total of 426 subjects were recruited to participate in our experiment. We use the procedures in Fis-
chbacher and Follmi-Heusi (2013) and add our experiment at the end of a previous experiment that took
around 90 minutes8. All sessions were run at the Laboratory for Research in Experimental Economics
(LINEEX) at the University of Valencia.
At the beginning of our experiment, subjects received a 10-sided die and a copy of the experimental
instructions. 9Their task consisted of rolling the die privately in their cubicles and reporting the number
from the first roll on the computer screen. Subjects could roll the die as many times as desired, but were
told that only the first throw was relevant for their payment.
We had five different treatments , which varied the payoffs that subjects received for reporting the
outcome of the dice (see Table 1) and the extent to which subjects manipulated their potential earnings.
• Baseline treatment (Baseline): At the end of the session, subjects received a sealed envelope with
a fixed amount (2.5), regardless of the number they reported.
• Gain with no money manipulation (Gain-NO): As in the baseline, subjects received their earnings
in a sealed envelope at the end of the session. In this treatment, earnings ranged between 0 (when
reporting 0) and 5 (when reporting 9).
• Loss with no money manipulation (Loss-NO): Before starting the session, subjects were informed
that they had been allocated with an initial endowment of 5 to be kept in an envelope by the
experimenter. Subjects were told that this would be used in a subsequent experiment. After
8Subjects in our experiment did not receive any feedback about the previous one until the end of the session. Our
experiment was presented as an independent task to subjects, in which they could earn some additional money (all subjects
decided to participate). This procedure is frequently used in the literature due to the short nature of the task.
9A translated version of the instructions can be found in Appendix A.
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finishing the first experiment (90 minutes), subjects were reminded about their 5 and presented with
our task. Subjects knew that the reported number would determine the amount to be deducted
from the envelope. This was given to subjects at the end of the session.
• Gain with money manipulation (Gain-MM): Again, earnings increased with the reported number
but subjects had an envelope with 5 on their desk before rolling the die. Each subject had to extract
their earnings from the envelope upon rolling the die and reporting the outcome on the computer
screen.
• Loss with money manipulation (Loss-MM): Subjects received the initial endowment (5) at the
beginning of the session. They could keep this endowment on their table or put it in their pockets10.
After finishing the first experiment (90 minutes), subjects were asked to take their initial endowment
and put it on their table. Subjects were given an empty envelope. They rolled the die, reported
the outcome, and placed the amount to be returned in the envelope before leaving the room.
Before proceeding to the hypotheses, there are some aspects of our experimental design that worth
mentioning. First, earnings associated with each reported number were equivalent in the Gain and the
Loss treatments. Second, we announced the initial endowment at the beginning of the session to subjects
in the Loss treatments to trigger loss aversion. Finally, subjects in money-manipulation treatments had
a second opportunity to cheat by misreporting the amount of money they had to take from or leave in
the envelope. In this respect, our evidence is consistent with Cameron and Miller (2009) or Schindler
and Pfattheicher (2017); we do not find that subjects recorded an outcome that did not correspond to
the amount of money they took from or left into the envelope.
4.2.2 Hypotheses
Consider first the Baseline treatment. If people have standard preferences, we should expect reports
to follow an equal distribution. We should also expect an equal distribution of reported numbers if lying
has a cost. Even if one cares about social image, it is not obvious that rolling a higher number is better.
Since we are not aware of any paper that directly tests for cheating behavior in the absence of economic
incentives, our first prediction is:
10Roughly 1/3 of the subjects decided to leave the money on the table. The rest put it in their pockets.
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Hypothesis 1: The distribution of reports in the Baseline treatment is not significantly different from
the uniform distribution.
In all of our treatments except the Baseline, people have a financial incentive to cheat (Fischbacher
and Fllmi-Heusi 2013, Shalvi et al. 2011, Abeler, Nosenzo and Raymond 2016). If people value money
and the cost of lying is not extreme, we should expect to see reports in the Gain and Loss treatments
that are significantly higher than that from either the uniform distribution or the Baseline. Thus, our
second hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 2: The numbers reported in the Gain and Loss treatments will be significantly higher than
those in the uniform distribution and in the Baseline.
In line with the literature on loss aversion (Kahenman and Tversky, 1979) and a plausible link between
loss aversion and choices made with gain and loss frames, we expected more cheating with loss framing,
leading to our third hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: The numbers reported in a Loss treatment will be significantly higher than those reported
in the corresponding Gain treatment.
While cheating has clear financial benefits in the Loss and Gain treatments, it may also have a moral
cost, e.g., subjects might be averse to cheat due to an intrinsic motivation to be honest (e.g., Lundquist
et al., 2009), social image (the choice is observed by the experimenter) (e.g., Gneezy, Kajackaite and
Sobel, 2016), a desire to hold a positive self view (e.g., Mazar, Amir and Ariely, 2008), or some form of
guilt aversion (e.g., Battagalli and Dufwenberg, 2007, 2009). A moral cost of cheating has been useful
to explain why we observe truth-shading rather than universal reporting of either the true value or the
maximum value in previous experiments. We therefore feel that entrusting people with money (on their
desk or at the beginning of the session) will increase the moral cost of lying, leading to our final hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4: The numbers reported in the money-manipulation treatments will be lower than in the
corresponding treatments without money manipulation.
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4.3 Results
Figure 1 displays the distribution of the reported numbers in each of the treatments. Table 1 sum-
marizes our data by including information on the frequency and cumulative distribution of reported
numbers. The average reported number is above the mean expected outcome (that predicted by the
uniform distribution) of 4.5 in all the treatments. In fact, more high numbers (5-9) are reported than
low numbers (0 − 4) in all treatments. Consistent with previous findings (Fischbacher and Fllmi-Heusi
2013, Utikal and Fischbacher 2013, Shalvi et al. 2011, Abeler, Nosenzo and Raymond 2016), there is no
single large spike at the payoff-maximizing outcome11 .
11We also note that there is no significant gender difference in any of the five treatments. The overall average number
reported by males (females) was 5.849 (5.633). The overall proportion of zeroes reported by males (females) was 0.050
(0.048), while the proportion of nines reported by males (females) was 0.171(0.172). See, among others, Cappelen Sorense-
nand and Tungodden,(2012), Childs (2012), Gylfason Arnardottir and Kristinsson (2013) and Pascual-Ezama, Prelec and
Dunfield (2015) for other studies showing no gender differences in cheating behavior.
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We proceed to test our hypotheses with both non-parametric tests and regression analysis. First, the
Kruskal-Wallis test rejects the hypothesis that observations in the different treatments come from the
same distribution (X24 = 14.95, p = 0.005), thus monetary incentives and/or the manipulation of money
seems to affect the reported outcomes. The results of out non-parametric analysis are summarized in
Table 2. We first investigate whether the reported outcomes in each of treatment differ from the actual
expected outcomes (i.e., the equal distribution) using a 2 test. Using Wilcoxon rank-sum and Kolmogorov-
Smirnov tests, we compare the reports in the Gain and Loss treatments with those in the Baseline (where
subjects have no incentives to cheat).
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Hypothesis 1 states that there will be no difference between reports in the Baseline treatment and
the expected outcomes of the die roll. In fact, while we do see a slight tendency towards reporting higher
numbers, the 2 test shows no significant difference between the reports in the Baseline and the actual
expected outcomes (p = 0.213)12. Thus, we see no significant evidence of distortion in the reports made
when there is no financial incentive for misreporting.
Result 1. There is no evidence of cheating in the absence of economic incentives. We expected more
cheating in our four treatments where there is a financial incentive to report a higher number than was
actually rolled, as stated in Hypothesis 2. Indeed, the Gain-NO and Loss-NO treatments have much
higher numbers than the expected true outcomes (p < 0.001) or the Baseline (p < 0.024). There is also
evidence in the Gain-MM treatment of distortion relative to the expected outcomes (p ¡ 0.001) and the
Baseline (p < 0.039). However, there is surprisingly little difference between the reports made in the
Loss-MM and Baseline treatments or between the reports in Loss-MM and the expected actual outcomes
(p > 0.230).
Result 2. Incentives affect cheating in all treatments except in the Loss-MM, where the distribution
of reported numbers is very close to the expected actual outcomes and the Baseline distribution.
Hypothesis 3 predicts that presumed loss aversion will manifest in more cheating in reports made in
the loss frame than those made in the gain frame. As suggested in the preceding paragraph, the ob-
served patterns do not support this hypothesis. In fact, there is very little difference in the reports across
the Gain-NO and Loss-NO; the average report is in fact only slightly higher in the Gain-NO treatment
(6.281 versus 6.214). The respective one-tailed test statistics and p-values are Z= −0.089, p = 0.536 and
KS = 0.042, p = 0.500. What may be even more surprising is that there is substantially less cheating in
Loss-MM than in Gain-MM. In any case, we have strong evidence to reject Hypothesis 3 in the money-
manipulation treatments.
Result 3. Incentives in the loss domain do not increase cheating behavior compared with incentives
in the gain domain.
12Throughout the paper, we round all p-values to three decimal places. The interested reader on the comparison between
the reported outcomes in each treatment and expected actual outcomes using the Wilcoxon rank-sum test or the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test of cumulative distributions can consult Appendix B (Table B1). This includes information on the fraction
of subjects who cheat to avoid the worst possible outcome using the estimation method in Garbarino, Slonim and Villeval
(2016).
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Finally, Hypothesis 4 predicts that money manipulation will lead to less cheating due to an increased
moral cost of lying. We find strong support for the hypothesis when we compare reports made in the
Loss-MM and Loss-NO treatments. In fact, the median (modal) report in the Loss-MM treatment is 5(7),
while the median (modal) report in the Loss-NO treatment is 7(9). The Wilcoxon test gives Z = 2.128,
p = 0.016, while the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test gives KS = 0.230, p = 0.008, both one-tailed tests. The
differences across the reports in the Gain-MM and Gain-NO treatments are considerably more modest
and not statistically significant. Here the Wilcoxon test gives Z = 1.144,p = 0.126, while the Kolmogorov
test gives KS = 0.119, p = 0.254, both one-tailed tests. Thus, we see that money manipulation makes a
real difference with a loss framing, but much less of a difference with a gain framing.
Result 4. Money manipulation reduces cheating behavior, especially in the loss framing.
We now proceed to the regression analysis. In Table 3, we report the results of a Tobit analysis,
where the set of independent variables include dummies for the gain frame and the manipulation of
money, as well as the interaction term13. The reported standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at
the session level. Our first regression in column (1) uses the data from all treatments except the Baseline.
Specifications (2) to (5) give the results for different Tobit models, depending on whether or not subjects
manipulate the money and the frame. As already suggested, there is no evidence of loss aversion in our
data. If there is no money-manipulation, the behavior in the Loss frame is not significantly different from
the behavior in the Gain frame. Money-manipulation does reduce the reported outcomes, but the effect
is only significant in the loss frame, in fact subjects cheat more in the Gain than in the Loss treatment
with money-manipulation.
13In our Tobit analysis in Appendix B (Table B2) the set of independent variables include dummies for each of the
treatment conditions, which are then compared with the Baseline reports. We note that ordinary least squares regressions
provide qualitatively the same results and similar levels of significance. Our findings are also robust to controlling for the
earnings of the previous experiment. While the subjects were not informed about such earnings when rolling the die, one
might argue that they might had formed some beliefs to be used as a reference point. Table B1 presents the correlation
between previous earnings and the reports, which is not statistically significant in any of the treatments (p > 0.165).
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4.4 Discussion
Our results confirm some expected patterns. For example, people do not lie when there is no financial
incentive to report an outcome different from the one that actually occurred; we find no significant dif-
ference between the reports made in this environment and the expected distribution of actual outcomes.
We also observe considerable dishonesty when there is a financial incentive to report a higher number,
which is consistent with previous work. Finally, money-manipulation seems to affect the moral cost of
cheating and thus the reported outcomes.
But our other results are largely surprising. We expected to find evidence of more cheating when
earnings associated to the report were framed as a loss, but we found absolutely no evidence of this in
a standard environment. When we conducted treatments where the participants were given envelopes
with the funds and then had to physically handle the money, we observe less cheating in the loss frame
than in the gain frame! In fact, there was only a modest and insignificant difference in the reports in the
Baseline treatment and the loss frame with money manipulation. This last result would appear to turn
conventional wisdom on its head.
What could explain these unexpected results? An important consideration regarding loss aversion
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is the reference point for gains and losses and this may be unclear in laboratory settings (Terzi et al.
2016). While loss aversion and reference dependence are widely accepted, the generality of loss-aversion
seems less than universal. A number of studies (e.g., Erev, Ert, and Yechiam, 2008; Harinck et al., 2007;
Kermer et al., 2006) examining the effect of losses in decision-making under risk and uncertainty in fact
find no evidence of loss aversion, as it occurs in our standard treatments. It is possible that subjects
in our gain and loss treatments were already cheating maximally (given their moral costs), thus the
(constrained) task prevented us to find more cheating under loss aversion; the spikes are in fact at the
maximum value in the standard treatments14. We decided to affect the moral costs of cheating by asking
subjects to manipulate the money. The spikes at higher numbers other than the maximum value in
the money-manipulation treatments suggest that many people who choose to lie do not wish to either be
seen as a liar (in fact by far the highest spike in all of the data is the spike at 7 in the Gain-MM treatment).
To our surprise, however, our null result was not driven by a lack of a sense of ownership of the funds
as we find evidence of reversed loss aversion in the money-manipulation treatments. Harinck et al. (2007)
document also this effect in a series of experiments where subjects are asked to rate how (un)pleasant
would be finding (losing) small amounts of money. They argue that the negative feelings associated with
small losses may be outweighed by the positive feelings associated with equivalent small gains. In our
experiment, these feelings are likely to be affected by the damage to ones image and the beliefs about
what is expected.
We suspect that if one feels trusted, one is more likely to respond in an honest or trustworthy man-
ner. It could be that it is more costly for subjects to cheat when they receive the money in advance
because they feel they have been trusted. If the feeling of being trusted leads to different beliefs about
what is expected, it could be the case that one believes that the trustor believes that one will behave
in a trustworthy manner; otherwise, one may experience disutility from guilt15. Perhaps people in the
money-manipulation treatments had different beliefs about the expectations of the experimenter than
people in the other variable-pay treatments. Having been endowed with visible money in the beginning
14Some people seem to care about reporting a higher number in the Baseline treatment, since more high numbers (5-9)
are reported than low numbers in this case more than 60% of the reports are high numbers. While there is no overall
difference between the reports in the Baseline and the expected true values, it is nevertheless the case that this 60% is
meaningful. The binomial test tells us the probability that 53 or more of 88 random draws in this treatment being high
numbers is only 2.8%.
15This goes to the issue of whether one is more honest if one feels trusted. Some evidence is provided for this idea in
Charness (2000). Additionally, Campbell (1935), May and Loyd (1993) and Haines et al. (1986) find that an honor system
induces more honesty than does a proctor. See also Mazar, Amir and Ariely (2008) or Gino, Ayal and Ariely (2009) for the
related evidence on the importance of honor codes on cheating behavior.
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of an experiment in the loss frame may also make cheating more salient than having an envelope from
which people can later take money. Mazar, Amir and Ariely (2008) and Gino Ayal and Ariely (2009)
find that subjects cheat less when cheating is salient. By asking subjects to return the money in the
loss treatment, we might also trigger impure altruism (Andreoni, 1989, 1990). Subjects can also have
different attitudes towards losing the money in the loss treatments with and without the manipulation of
money, as paper losses can be treated differently from those that are realized (Weber and Zuchel 2005;
Imas, 2016); this can be due to mental accounting (Thaler, 1985).
One might nevertheless wonder why there was more cheating in the loss frame than in the gain frame
in other studies. In our study, there is nothing regarding ones own ability, while the work of Cameron
and Miller (2009), Cameron, Miller and Monin (2010) or Grolleau, Kocher and Sutan (2016) involves
reporting ones own performance in a cognitive task. Ones judgment about own ability seems to be more
malleable than ones judgment about events over which one has no control, as seen in the updating studies
mentioned earlier. Indeed, lying is likely to have some moral cost, but one would like to appear talented
or capable in the eyes of those who may be watching or even ones self; in fact, this may not even be a
conscious tendency (see Charness, Rustichini, and van de Ven, 2014)16. Using the die-roll task, Schindler
and Pfattheicher (2017) allows for multiple rolls of the die and find that reports are larger under loss
aversion, but the authors do not find evidence that people cheat in a gain setting. We complement
their findings by also looking at the effects of the moral costs, which seems to be a crucial element in
understanding cheating behavior.
4.5 Conclusion
Our paper investigates cheating behavior when experimental participants are asked to reveal a piece
of private information that does not reflect on their personal ability and where ones choice does not
affect the financial payoffs of other participants. This information concerns the state of the world. In
the Baseline treatment, there is no financial incentive for misreporting the state of the world and the
reports made do not differ significantly from expected outcomes with random draws. On the other hand,
reports when there are financial incentives to cheat generally show considerable evidence of lying on the
16Some people even seem to care about reporting a higher number in the Baseline treatment, since more high numbers
(5-9) are reported than low numbers in this case more than 60% of the reports are high numbers. While there is no overall
difference between the reports in the Baseline and the expected true values, it is nevertheless the case that this 60% is
meaningful. The binomial test tells us the probability that 53 or more of 88 random draws in this treatment being high
numbers is only 2.8%.
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reports made. In addition, we study cheating in the absence of payoff externalities, in that only ones own
material payoff is affected by reported outcome.
We do not find evidence that loss aversion translates into this environment. There is no difference
in behavior across gain and loss frames when payment is simply made at the end of the session. More
remarkably, when we endow participants with prospective payment in advance, there is substantially less
cheating in the loss frame. We presume that the observed behavior represents differences in the moral
cost of cheating, reflected by either some form of guilt aversion or a desire to have a favorable self-image
or social image.
Our results represent a challenge for the more standard behavioral theories such as loss aversion and
reference points. It seems that the moral cost of behavior is an element that must not be ignored. We
expect more research will follow on this theme, as it is critical to understanding cheating and corruption
in the world at large.
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4.7 Appendix A: Experimental Instructions (originally in Spanish)
BASELINE TREATMENT
Instructions (to be read aloud)
The aim of this experiment is to study decision-making. We are not interested in your particular choices
but rather on the individuals average behavior. Thus, all through the experiment you will be treated
anonymously. Neither the experimenters nor the people in this room will ever know your particular
choices.
Next, you will receive the instructions and a 10-sided die. Instructions should be easy to follow. Please
read the instructions carefully and raise your hand if you have any doubt, as it is important that you
understand the instructions before starting the experiment.
Instructions
The aim of this experiment is to study decision-making. We are not interested in your particular
choices but rather on the individuals average behavior. Thus, all through the experiment you will be
treated anonymously. Neither the experimenters nor the people in this room will ever know your par-
ticular choices. Please do not think that we expect a particular behavior from you. However, take into
account that your decisions along the experiment may affect your earnings. Below, you will find details
of your task in this experiment. Please follow the instructions carefully, as it is important that you
understand the experiment before starting. Talking with each other is forbidden during the experiment.
If you have any questions, raise your hand and remain silent. You will be attended by the instructor as
soon as possible.
What is the experiment about?
Your task consists on throwing the 10-sided dice that you received memorizing the number that you
obtain in the first throw. This number will determine your earnings as is shown in the table below.
This means that you will earn 2.50 regardless of the number that you report. First, we ask you to
roll the dice and memorize the number you obtain in the first throw. Then, introduce this number in the
computer screen. You can throw the dice as many times as you want to test that it works properly. Still,
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your payment depends only on the number you report for the first throw. At the end of the experiment,
you will receive your earnings (in an anonymous way) in a sealed envelope.
GAIN-NO TREATMENT
Instructions (to be read aloud after the first experiment)
The aim of this experiment is to study decision-making. We are not interested in your particular choices
but rather on the individuals average behavior. Thus, all through the experiment you will be treated
anonymously. Neither the experimenters nor the people in this room will ever know your particular
choices.
Next, you will receive the instructions and a 10-sided die. Instructions should be easy to follow.
Please read the instructions carefully and raise your hand if you have any doubt as it is important that
you understand the instructions before starting the experiment.
Instructions (to be read privately)
The aim of this experiment is to study decision-making. We are not interested in your particular
choices but rather on the individuals average behavior. Thus, all through the experiment you will be
treated anonymously. Neither the experimenters nor the people in this room will ever know your par-
ticular choices. Please do not think that we expect a particular behavior from you. However, take into
account that your decisions along the experiment may affect your earnings. Below, you will find details
of your task in this experiment. Please follow the instructions carefully, as it is important that you
understand the experiment before starting. Talking with each other is forbidden during the experiment.
If you have any questions, raise your hand and remain silent. You will be attended by the instructor as
soon as possible.
What is the experiment about?
Your task consists on throwing the 10-sided dice that you received memorizing the number that you
obtain in the first throw. This number will determine your earnings as is shown in the table below.
This means that you will earn 0 if the number you report is 0, 1 if the number you report is 1, 1.50
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if the number you report is 2, so on, obtaining an amount of 5 if you report a 9.
First, we ask you to roll the dice and memorize the number you obtain in the first throw.
Then, introduce this number in the computer screen.
You can throw the dice as many times as you want to test that it works properly. Still, your payment
depends only on the number you report for the first throw.
At the end of the experiment, you will receive your earnings (in an anonymous way) in a sealed envelope.
LOSS-NO TREATMENT
Welcome (to be read aloud at the beginning of the session)
Welcome to the lab! Today, you have received an initial amount of 5 Euros for participating in an
experiment that follows the one that is about to start. From now, this money belongs to you. Next, we
will explain to you the instructions of the first experiment.
(Subjects participate in the first experiment)
Instructions (to be read aloud after the first experiment) The aim of this experiment is to
study decision-making. We are not interested in your particular choices but rather on the individuals
average behavior. Thus, all through the experiment you will be treated anonymously. Neither the exper-
imenters nor the people in this room will ever know your particular choices.
Next, you will receive the instructions and a 10-sided die. Instructions should be easy to follow.
Please read the instructions carefully and raise your hand if you have any doubt as it is important that
you understand the instructions before starting the experiment.
What is the experiment about? Before starting the experiment you received 5 e.
Your task consists on throwing the 10-sided dice that you received memorizing the number that you
obtain in the first throw. This number will determine your earnings as is shown in the table below.
This means that you will return 5 e. if the number you report is 0, 4 e. if the number you report is
1, 3.50e. if the number you report is 2, so on, returning an amount of 0 e. if you report a 9.
First, we ask you to roll the dice and memorize the number you obtain in the first throw.
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Then, introduce this number in the computer screen. We shall subtract the amount that you need to
return from your initial 5 Euros.
You can throw the dice as many times as you want to test that it works properly, still your payment
depends only on the number you report for the first throw.
At the end of the experiment, you will receive your earnings (in an anonymous way) in a sealed envelope.
GAIN-MM TREATMENT
Instructions (to be read aloud after the first experiment)
The aim of this experiment is to study decision-making. We are not interested in your particular
choices but rather on the individuals average behavior. Thus, all through the experiment you will be
treated anonymously. Neither the experimenters nor the people in this room will ever know your partic-
ular choices.
Next, you will receive the instructions, an envelope with 5 Euros and a 10-sided die. Instructions
should be easy to follow. Please read the instructions carefully and raise your hand if you have any doubt
as it is important that you understand the instructions before starting the experiment.
(The envelope was left on the table when instructions were given to participants. We underline the
sentence to highlight differences with respect to other treatments.)
Instructions (to be read privately)
The aim of this experiment is to study decision-making. We are not interested in your particular
choices but rather on the individuals average behavior. Thus, all through the experiment you will be
treated anonymously. Neither the experimenters nor the people in this room will ever know your par-
ticular choices. Please do not think that we expect a particular behavior from you. However, take into
account that your decisions along the experiment may affect your earnings. Below, you will find details
of your task in this experiment. Please follow the instructions carefully, as it is important that you
understand the experiment before starting. Talking with each other is forbidden during the experiment.
If you have any questions, raise your hand and remain silent. You will be attended by the instructor as
soon as possible.
What is the experiment about?
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Your task consists on throwing the 10-sided dice that you received memorizing the number that you
obtain in the first throw. This number will determine your earnings as is shown in the table below.
This means that you will earn 0 eif the number you report is 0, 1 eif the number you report is 1,
1.50eif the number you report is 2, so on, obtaining an amount of 5 eif you report a 9.
First, we ask you to roll the dice and memorize the number you obtain in the first throw.
Then, report this number using the computer screen. There is an envelope with 5 Euros on your
table. Take the money that corresponds to your throw and sealed it.
You can throw the dice as many times as you want to test that it works properly, still your payment
depends only on the number you reported for the first throw. At the end of the experiment, the instructor
will pick up the sealed envelopes when you leave the room. Your earnings will be anonymous.
LOSS-MM TREATMENT
(Subjects are given 5 Euros when entering the room)
Welcome (to be read aloud at the beginning of the session)
Welcome to the lab! Today, you have received an initial amount of 5 Euros for participating in an
experiment that follows the one that is about to start. From now, this money belongs to you. Next, we
will explain to you the instructions of the first experiment.
(We observe that roughly 1/3of the subjects decided to leave the money on the table, while 2/3 of the
subjects kept it in their pockets or bags. Subjects participate in the first experiment. After finishing the
first experiment, we ask subjects to take their endowment and put it on the table.)
Instructions (to be read aloud after the first experiment)
The aim of this experiment is to study decision-making. We are not interested in your particular
choices but rather on the individuals average behavior. Thus, all through the experiment you will be
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treated anonymously. Neither the experimenters nor the people in this room will ever know your partic-
ular choices.
Next, you will receive the instructions, an empty envelope and a 10-sided die. Instructions should be
easy to follow. Please read the instructions carefully and raise your hand if you have any doubt as it is
important that you understand the instructions before starting the experiment.
(The envelope was left on the table when instructions were given to participants. We underline the
sentence to highlight differences with respect to other treatments.)
What is the experiment about? Before starting the experiment you received 5e. Your task
consists on throwing the 10 sided dice that you received memorizing the number that you obtain in the
first throw. This number will determine your earnings as is shown in the table below.
This means that you will return 5 eif the number you report is 0, 4 eif the number you report is 1,
3.50eif the number you report is 2, so on, returning an amount of 0 eif you report a 9. First, we ask you
to roll the dice and memorize the number you obtain in the first throw. Then, introduce this number
in the computer screen. Place the amount that you need to return in the envelope and sealed it. You
can throw the dice as many times as you want to test that it works properly, still your payment depends
only on number obtained on the first throw. At the end of the experiment, the instructor will pick up
the envelopes. Your earnings will be anonymous.
4.8 Appendix B
In Section 3, we use a 2 test to investigate whether the reported outcomes differ from the expected ones
(i.e., the equal distribution). In the first columns of Table B1, we show that our results are robust to the
Wilcoxon rank-sum test (Z) and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test of cumulative distributions, except
for the Loss-MM treatment, where the one-tailed comparisons between the reports and the expected
actual outcomes come close to statistical significance.
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The literature on cheating behavior has usually identified honest subjects as those who report the
worst possible outcome (Fischbacher and Fllmi-Heusi, 2013). The third column of Table B1 reports
the fraction of subjects who cheat to avoid the worst possible outcome (receiving nothing) using the
estimation method in Garbarino, Slonim and Villeval (2016). The last column of Table B1 reports the
correlation between the reported outcomes and the participants earnings in the previous experiment.
While this is negative and never significant .
In Table B2, we report the results of a Tobit analysis, where the set of independent variables include
dummies for our treatment conditions. The reported standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at
the session level.
In line with our previous analysis, we find that all treatments are statistically different from the
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Baseline (p < 0.01) except for the Loss-MM treatment (p = 0.231). Pairwise comparisons confirm that
there is no significant difference between reports in Gain-NO and Loss-NO (p = 0.674), while there is a
significant difference between the reports in the Gain-MM and Loss-MM treatments (p = 0.016). We also
see that there is a significant difference between the reports in the Loss-NO and Loss-MM treatments
(p = 0.003), while the difference between the reports in the Gain-NO and Gain-MM treatments is weakly
significant (p = 0.062), this suggesting that the manipulation of money can also have an effect in the
Gain treatments in the expected direction.
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5 CHAPTER 3
Environmental regulation and the firm’s in-
ternationalization strategy
5.1 Introduction
Environmental regulation has been under the spotlight for a long time, but it has acquired particular
relevance in recent years as public concern regarding both the environment itself and the wider impact
of pollution on human health increases. The international community is increasingly scrutinising those
countries that pollute the most, making this a particularly active area for policy research.
According to the Pollution Haven Hypothesis, firms which wish to relocate their production will seek
to do so in countries where resources are cheaper; this includes the cost of pollution. Due to differing
policy environments, firms from developed countries tend to relocate to less developed countries, where
the labour is cheaper and the environmental laws are more lax. It is also in the interests of less developed
countries to attract FDI, as this benefits such economies in terms of employment creation, tax revenues,
technology transfers, and through numerous other mechanisms. Hence, LDCs have incentive to engage
in a race to the bottom, undercutting one anothers standards to attract the FDI and capital inflows.
Consideration to such so-called pollution havens is of great importance in the formulation of environ-
mental and international trade policies, but their existence is not always clear in the literature. Several
publications find inconclusive evidence in support of a relationship between FDI and environmental regu-
lation (Dean et al., 2009; Levison, 1996a,b; List et al., Brunnermeir and Levinson (2004); and Frederikson
et al., 2003 among others). Recent developments in the literature link the pollution haven effect to a
countrys institutional corruption (Beata and Wei, 2005), endogenous market structure (Frederik et al.,
2003; Elliott and Zhou, 2013), and small market sizes (Dong et al., 2012), amongst other factors.
More recently, a small number of papers have emerged that model the process through which more
stringent environmental regulations may not deter or induce local firms to relocate. Dijkstra et al. (2011)
demonstrate in a Cournot duopoly setting (with an exogenous duopoly market structure in the host coun-
try) that FDI is more likely if higher regulation costs raise the costs for the domestic firm over and above
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those for the foreign firm. Sanna-Randaccio and Sestini (2012) show that when the market size of the
home country is large, more stringent environ- mental regulation does not necessarily induce firms to
relocate to foreign countries with lax environmental regulations. Elliott and Zhou (2013) also conclude
that if the production is dirty enough, more stringent regulation can encourage FDI.
The mixed evidence for the existence of PHH may be driven by heterogeneity between investments,
which is not accounted for in the aforementioned literature (Bialek, 2015). Levinson and Taylor (2013)
also find evidence in support of this hypothesis. Accounting for this heterogeneity involves recognising
that the FDI can take two forms: Greenfield and Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A). While Greenfield
implies settling a new firm, MA means acquiring or merging with a firm already in existence in the LDC.
This difference might explain the inconclusiveness of evidence with respect to a relationship between
FDI and environmental regulation; grandfathering policies, i.e. a policy environment whereby newly
settled firms are subject to more stringent environmental regulations comparative to incumbent firms,
which might be subject to older regulations. In general, newer regulatory frameworks are more stringent
(Low and Yeats, 1992; Leonard, 1988; Kahn, 2000). This is an important characteristic of environmental
policy: requiring all firms in operation to simultaneously adjust to a new regulatory framework would
require a long implementation period, and would be more costly, hence it is common practice for only
newly settled firms to be subjected to newer, more stringent, regulations. For example, one of the
important innovations of the 1970 Clean Air Act (CAA or the Act) in the U.S., was the decision to
regulate air pollution sources directly. However, recognising that companies had already invested capital
in existing sources, and that the cost of retrofitting these sources with modern pollution controls is often
prohibitive, Congress did not require owners of existing stationary sources to install air pollution control
technology until these factories were modified or upgraded in a way that would increase air pollution.
One key point is that, in the case of M&A, the environmental regulation that the firm is subject to may
affect the acquisition price. Indeed, MA are less sensitive to differences in international taxes than Green-
field investment, which is consistent with capitalisation of taxes in the acquisition price (Hebous et al.,
2011). Hence, we expect Greenfield investment to be more sensitive to current environmental regulations.
As far as we know, the literature hitherto has not distinguished between the two modes of FDI (Green-
field and M&A) when studying the relationship between FDI and environmental policy stringency. Bialek
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and (2015) shows that investors preferences for environmental laxity depend strongly on both the mode of
FDI and the pollution intensity of the sector, where stringency is only found to be significant for Green-
field investments, while increased restrictiveness of regulation has a positive effect on the probability of
clean Brownfield investment in a given jurisdiction.
Moreover, in the case of an M&A investment, the acquisition price may already be a function of the
regulation faced by the company. This is in analogy to the taxation literature which states that in a high
tax country a portion of the tax burden may be capitalized, reducing the acquisition price (Hebous et
al., 2011). Due to those reasons I expect that Greenfield projects have a significantly higher sensitivity
with respect to environmental requirements than M&A investments.
As far as I know, the distinction between the two modes of entry has not been taken into account in
the literature on the effects of environmental regulation on FDI location.
An exemption will be the empirical working paper by Bialek and (2015), where they show that in-
vestors preferences for environmental laxity depend strongly on both the mode of FDI and the pollution
intensity of the sector, being the stringency only significant for Greenfield investments, while increased
restrictiveness of regulation has a positive effect on the probability of clean Brownfield investment in a
given jurisdiction.
Our results contribute to a possible explanation for the mixed evidence in the empirical literature and
provide an illustration of the conditions under which environmental regulations in the host country can
affect the location decision of foreign firms. I develop a North-South model under Cournot competition,
where a The current article considers a unilateral FDI model with endogenously determined environmen-
tal standards, and FDI decisions. Hence, this article differs from existing papers in that the analytical
framework is rich enough to accommodate the PHH, race-to-the-bottom, race-to-the-top, and regulatory
chill phenomena. Second, I endogenize a firms FDI decision by allowing for its optimized choice betIen
FDI Greenfield and M&A.
In this model, the game played is a one-shot Cournot market share game, that is, firms move before
governments make policy decisions 17.
17This is where governments cannot commit and so set environmental policies after firms decide where to locate. Even
in the Market Share Game firms may still base their location decisions on the environmental policies which they expect
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This model is used by Dong et al. (2012), which is similar to ours. The environmental policy in-
strument in this model is emission standard. Emission standard, also called performance standard, is
a kind of command and control (CAC) instrument. It does not bring government any fiscal revenue.
Environmental tax, which generates revenues for the government on the other hand, is a typical type
of market-based incentive (MBI) instrument. Fullerton (2001) has clarified that emission standard and
environmental tax can achieve the same efficiency effect, i.e., they can improve the economic efficiency by
the same level under symmetric information. Yet emission standard may be more efficient in monitoring
and enforcement when information is asymmetric betIen the regulator and the regulated. The model
of this article combines two modes of FDI that are differently affected by the environmental policy and
optimal emission standards.
The main results of this article are that (i) The mode of FDI entrance will depend on the market size,
level of pollution of the industry, emission standard and product substitutability, where the intuitive rel-
ative incentive -as lax current regulation, market size, strict old regulation, and highly pollutant industry
encouraging Greenfield investment over the Brownfield one- only hold for sufficiently big market sizes
or differentiated products (ii) a granfathering policy, where the standard for newly settled firms is more
strict than the standard for old firms, is a strategic decision; (iii) a highly pollutant industry increases
the gap betIen the old and the new pollution standards.
The rest of the article is organized as follows: Sect. 1 introduces the basic model, Sect. 3 analyses
the equilibrium under exogenous pollution standards, Sect. 4 analyses the equilibrium under endogenous
pollution standards, and Sec. 5 concludes the model with some discussions of policy implications.
5.2 Model
I consider an industry that has activity in two countries, one denoted by the North country and the
other by the South country. Each country has its own separated market. The North market has one
active firm, while the South one has two active firms. These firms will be denoted by N, S1 and S2
respectively. The firm in the North produces a different variety of the product produced in the South by
(rationally) governments to introduce after they have located.
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the South firms. I want to study the incentives that one firm has to expand its sales to the other country
either by (1) setting up a new factory there or (2) buying an existing firm. I assume there is no trade
betIen the North and the South country, and I focus on the South market, where the firms compete a
la Cournot. Then the North firm decides whether it does Foreign Direct Investment by setting a new
factory (FDI Greenfield) or acquires an existing one (FDI Brownfield) in the South country to compete
with the South firms. For this purpose I develop a one-shot game.
The main purpose of this paper is to analyse the effects of the Environmental regulation law in a
host country on the internationalization strategies of abroad firms, more concretely the unitary pollution
emission allowance, which I will refer to as the emission standard from now on.
First, I analyse how the decision of the abroad firm is affected by an exogenously determined emission
standard. Then, I consider what the optimal emission standard will be if it is endogenously determined.
In the case of Brownfield investment, I assume that the existing firms are subject to different emis-
sion standards from the newly settled firms, being that the new firms are more restricted than the old
ones. This fits with the fact that, in many countries, existing firms are excluded from abiding by new
regulations. I model this situation as a sequential game with two players, which are the North firm and
one of the South firms. I assume the acquaried South firm to be S2, while S1 stays in the market and
competes with the acquirer.
The case of Greenfield investment is modeled as a sequential game with three players. I find the
sub-game perfect equilibrium for the endogenous emission standard case, taken that the South country’s
government goal is to maximize the total Ilfare in the South country.
As already mentioned, two internationalization strategies are considered:
1. To undertake Greenfield FDI (denoted by G). This will entail building a factory in the host country
and thus incurring in a set-up fixed cost, denoted by FG.
2. To undertake Brownfield FDI (denoted by B). This will entail a fixed cost of buying one of the
existing firms in the host country.
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3. The third considered (outside) option for the North firm is choosing not to internationalise (denoted
by ”No int”).
The game played in this model is the market share game, in which firms make decisions before
governments do. Hence, my setup differs from the race-to-the-bottom game seen in several previous
papers where governments make decisions on environmental policies first.
The inverse demand system for differentiated products is given by:
px = a−X − γY, py = a− Y − γX (1)
Where X denotes the total output sold of the product produced by the North firm, and Y denotes
the total output sold of the product produced by the South firms. px and py are the prices of X and
Y . I assume that the constant average cost of production for both products is c, with c < a. Since X
and Y are imperfect substitutes, γ(0, 1) denotes the level of product substitution among both products.
Products are independent when γ = 0, and perfect substitutes when γ = 1.
5.3 Emission standard is exogenous
I firstly consider the case of exogenous emission standards. X stands for the production of the North
firm. I assume that the host country protects intellectual property. About Y ; for Greenfield and duopoly
Y = yS1 +yS2 , and for Brownfield Y = yS1 +yN , where subscripts N , S1 and S2 refer to the firms origin.
I assume that, when the North firm acquires a South firm, it also acquires the intellectual property and
technology to produce Y . In the first stage, the North firm decides whether to engage in Greenfield FDI,
acquire an existing firm or not to internationalise in the South market. Then one of the South firms
(assumed to be S2) decides whether to sell its firm or not. This has implication on N firm’s fixed costs,
varieties produced and number of firms finally competing in the market.
I denote the emission standard in the South country by e, where ej{0, 1} is the per-unit emission
level allowed by the South country, being e0 the permission for the stablished firms, and e1 the permission
for the newly stablished firms.
I assume that the marginal cost function of firm i is ci(ej) = c+(θ−ej), where i{N,S1, S2} and j{0, 1},
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is a function of ej . This means that the emission standard may be different for established firms and for
new firms, being that the standard for new firms will be more restrictive than the one for stablished firms.
Let θ be the total amount of pollutant generated by the firms when producing one unit of product, then
0 ≤ ej ≤ θ (as the emission standard will be betIen 0 and the total unitary pollution of the industry),
and θ − ej is the amount of abatement, which I assume to be unitary. I also assume all the firms are
symmetrical regarding production costs, pollution emission levels and abatement costs.
As an initial assumption, I consider a > c+ θ− e0, a > c+ θ− e1, meaning that the South market is
profitable.
The order of the play is as follows:
1. Firm N chooses an internationalization strategy (No int, G, B). If the firm chooses “No int” the
game ends here, if it chooses G, I jump to step 4.
2. Firm S2 decides whether it sells or not (Sell, no sell), in the case that N chooses to undertake
Brownfield.
3. Firm N decides its internationalization strategy taken the South firm’s decision.
4. Firms compete in quantities. If N acquires an existing firm, I will have two firms competing a la
Cournot (N and S1), but three firms if N settles a new factory (N, S1 and S2).
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5.3.1 The North firm enters as Greenfield investor
Firms maximize the following profit functions:
ΠNG = pxx− (c+ θ − e1)x− FG
ΠS1G = pyyS1 − (c+ θ − e0)yS1 (2)
ΠS2G = pyyS2 − (c+ θ − e0)yS2
Where the subscript NG refers to the variable for the North firm, given that the North firm has
decided to do Greenfield investment in the first stage. Similarly, S1G and S2G refer to the equilibrium
variable from South firms when the North firm engages in Greenfield investment. FG refers to the fixed
cost of setting a new factory in the South country.
Via maximization, we obtain the following equilibrium profits 18:
ΠNG =
1
2
(a(2γ − 3)− 2γ(c+ θ − e0) + 3(c+ θ − e1))2
2(γ2 − 3)2 − 2FG
ΠS1G = ΠS2G =
(a(γ − 2)− γ(c+ θ − e1) + 2(c+ θ − e0))2
4(γ2 − 3)2
Profits will always be positive if the fixed cost is below a threshold, that is:
F <
(a(2γ − 3)− 2γ(c+ θ − e0) + 3(c+ θ − e1))2
4 (γ2 − 3)2
From now on, I will denote this threshold by τG, hence τG = (a(2γ−3)−2γ(c+θ−e0)+3(c+θ−e1))
2
4(γ2−3)2 .
5.3.2 The North firm enters as an acquirer
In this scenario, the North firm can produce both X and Y (as N is acquiring the South firm, now
it owns the technology to produce product Y ), to which I will refer as Brownfield type 1 (or B1) 19. In
order to acquire firm S2, the North firm must pay for it the amount that will make S2 indifferent between
selling or not, plus a margin. This amount will be different depending on the next preferred alternative
strategy for the North firm.
18see Appendix 2 for first order and non-negative conditions
19see appendix 4 for special case where N prodces only one variety
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If the profits of investing in Greenfield are zero or negative, the preferred strategy will be not investing.
If firm N does not invest, South firms will compete in a duopoly. In this case, the N firm will have to pay
at least the duopoly benefit (ΠS2D) to the South firm in order to acquire it. If the profits of investing
in Greenfield investment are positive, the alternative preferred strategy is Greenfield, as the profits of
not investing are zero. In this case, the North firm will have to pay to the South firm at least the profit
that the South firm would make if N chose to invest in Greenfield (ΠS2G), in order to acquire it. I will
consider the three possible Brownfield modes of entry for this two acquaring cases (the North firm paying
ΠS2D and ΠS2G) .
When ΠNG > 0 I study the case in which the benefits for the North firm under Greenfield investment
are positive. This is true when the following condition holds:
F < τG =
(a(2γ − 3)− 2γ(c+ θ − e0) + 3(c+ θ − e1))2
4 (γ2 − 3)2
In this case, the North firm’s best option if no firm in the South wants to sell its factory, is engaging in
Greenfield investment. Hence, the North firm will have to pay to the South firm at least its Greenfield
profits in order to acquire it, and the fixed cost FB will be equal to ΠS2G for the three next cases.
When the North firm produces both products X and Y, firms maximize the following profit functions
20:
ΠNB1 = pxx+ pyyN − (c+ θ − e0)(x+ yN )− FB (3)
ΠS1B1 = pyyS1 − yS1(c+ θ − e0) (4)
Where the subscript NB1 and S1B1 refer to the equilibrium variable for the respective firms given
that the North firm has decided to undertake Brownfield investment in the first stage.
Via maximization, we obtain the following equilibrium profits 21:
20For the special cases in which N produces a single product, see Appendix 4
21For first order and non-negative conditions see appendix 3
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ΠNB1 =
1
36(1 + γ)
(13c2 + 26ce0 + 13e
2
0 + a
2(13− 5γ)− 5c2γ − 10ce0γ − 5e20γ + 2a(−13 + 5γ)(c+ e0 − θ)
+2(c+ e0)(−13 + 5γ)θ + (13− 5γ)θ2)− Fb(36 + 36γ)
36(1 + γ)
ΠS1B1 =
1
9
(a− c+ e0 − θ)2
Finally, if I substitute FB in ΠNB1, I obtain:
ΠNB1 =
1
36
(
9(γ − 3)2(a− c− θ)2
(γ2 − 3)2 −
2(γ − 2)(a− c+ e0 − θ)(a+ 2(c− e0 + θ))
γ + 1
+
6(γ − 5)(a(γ(13γ − 10)− 131)− 6(γ + 7)2(c+ θ))(a− c+ e0 − θ)
(γ − 17)(γ + 1)(7γ + 25)
−3(a− c+ e0 − θ)(a(γ − 3)− (γ + 3)(c− e0 + θ))
γ + 1
)
When ΠNG ≤ 0 I study the case in which the benefits for the North firm under Greenfield investment
are negative. This is true when the following condition holds:
F > τG =
(a(2γ − 3)− 2γ(c+ e0 − θ) + 3(c+ e1 − θ))2
4 (γ2 − 3)2
In this case, the best option for the North firm if no firm in the South wants to sell its factory, is not
internationalising its production. Hence, the North firm will have to pay to the South firm at least its
Duopoly profits in order to acquire it, thus the fixed cost FB will be equal to ΠS2D for the three next cases.
When the North firm produces both products, firms maximize the following profit functions 22:
ΠNB1 = pxx+ pyyN − (x+ yN )(c− e0 + θ)− FB
ΠS1B1 = pyyS1 − (c− e0 + θ)yS1 (5)
Where the subscript NB1, S1B1 and S2B1 means the equilibrium variable for the respective firms
given that the North firm has decided to undertake Brownfield investment in the first stage, and S2D
refers to the duopoly profits of the firm S2.
22For the special cases in which N produces a single product, see Appendix 6
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Via maximization I obtain the following profits 23:
ΠNB1 =
1
36(1 + γ)
(13c2 + 26ce0 + 13e
2
0 + a
2(13− 5γ)− 5c2γ − 10ce0γ − 5e20γ + 2a(5γ − 13)(c+ e0 − θ)
+2(c+ e0)(−13 + 5γ)θ + (13− 5γ)θ2)− FB(36 + 36γ)
36(1 + γ)
ΠS1B1 =
1
9
(a− c+ e0 − θ)2
Finally, if I substitute FB in ΠNB1, I obtain:
ΠNB1 =
(1− γ)(a− c+ e0 − θ)2
4(γ + 1)
5.3.3 Analysis
Now I are interested on looking at the Nash equilibriums of this first game. I will distinguish between
3 cases that will lead to different Nash equilibria:
• Case one ΠNG > ΠNB1 > 0 .This is true when FG < τB .
• Case two ΠNB1 > ΠNG > 0. This is true when τB < FG < τG.
• Case three ΠNB1 > 0 > ΠNG . This is true when F > τG.
I can now select the subgame perfect Nash equilibria. These are the solutions for our game. As before,
I will obtain different solutions depending on the value of the parameters.
Proposition 1:
i) If ΠNG > ΠNB1 > 0, then the SPNE is ((G, G, B1), sell).
ii) If ΠNB1 > ΠNG > 0, then the SPNE is ((B, G, B1), sell).
iii) If ΠNB1 > 0 > ΠNG, then the SPNE is ((B, No int, B1), sell).
23for first order and non-negative conditions see Appendix 5
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The way to interpret the Nash equilibrium is the following: the first three strategies inside the paren-
thesis refer to the North’s decision in the nodes 1, 3 and 4. The remaining strategy is the South firm’s
decision in the node 2.
i) When the fixed cost of setting a new factory is lower than a threshold τB , the benefit from investing
in Greenfield is higher than the benefit from investing in Brownfield, both being positive. In this scenario,
the North firm will choose Greenfield over Brownfield, Brownfield type 1 if the South firm sells its factory
(that is producing both products X and Y), and Greenfield if it does not. The South firm will choose to
sell its factory.
ii) On the contrary, when the fixed cost is higher than τB (but smaller than τG), the benefit from acquir-
ing an existing firm is higher than the benefit from Greenfield, both being positive, the North firm will
choose Brownfield over Greenfield, Brownfield type 1 if the South firm sells its factory, and Greenfield if
it does not. The South firm will choose to sell its factory.
iii) When the cost of setting a factory is higher than a threshold F > τG, the North firm’s profit from
investing in Greenfield is negative. Hence the North firm will choose Brownfield over Greenfield, Brown-
field type 1 if the South firm sells its factory, and not internationalizing if it does not. The South firm
will choose to sell its factory.
Note that the firm S2 will always sell, since the North firm has no incentive to offer a quantity that
will not be accepted.
The threshold τB will also depend on the value of the parameters of the model, meaning that the
parameters can influence this threshold. I will say that an increase in a parameter encourages Greenfield
(or discourages Brownfield), when this parameter has a positive impact in the threshold. If the threshold
is bigger, then Greenfield will be better than Brownfield for more possible values of the fixed cost F.
On the contrary, I will say that a parameter discourages Greenfield (or encourages Brownfield) when
it has a negative impact on the threshold. If the threshold is smaller, then Greenfield will be better
than Brownfield for less possible values of the fixed cost F. Note that, even if a parameter encourages or
discourages either of the strategies, the final result will always depend on the real value of the fixed cost.
The change of the parameters will only make one of the strategies more likely to be profitable over the
other one.
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The market size a will generally have a bigger impact on the Brownfield benefit, when the firm
investing in Brownfield is producing two products, hence participating in two markets. But the market
size will encourage Greenfield over Brownfield when the market is relatively small and the products are
not perfectly differentiated: γ > 0 and a < τa.
The impact of the old emission standard e0 will depend on the product substitutability and the market
size. e0 will encourage Greenfield if γ > τ
e0γ and a < τae0 . Hence, when the products are not perfectly
differentiated, the benefit from engaging in Brownfield and producing the two products decreases.
An increase in the new emission standard e1 will only encourage Greenfield investment when the
market size is relatively big a > τe1a.
An increase in the product substitutability will affect negatively the profits for both strategies, but an
increase on it will always encourage Greenfield investment over Brownfield since the benefit of producing
two products decreases when they are similar.
An increase in θ will affect negatively the profits for both strategies via an increase in the costs, but
it also decreases the cost of acquiring firm S2. It will incentivise Greenfield under two scenarios, where
the decrease in the profits of Brownfield will be higher than the decrease in the price of S2:
(1) γ = 0 . When the products are differentiated, an increase in the pollution of the industry will
encourage Greenfield over Brownfield.
(2) γ > 0 and a < τa. When the products are substitutes to any degree and the market is relatively
small, an increase in the pollution of the industry will encourage Greenfield over Brownfield.
5.4 Emission standard is endogenous
Now I want to examine the internationalization game when the emission standard is endogenous.
This means that the South Country’s government will anticipate the North firm’s decision, hence setting
a pollution standard that maximizes the welfare in the South country. I will have two cases: when the
South government anticipates that the North firm will engage in Greenfield investment, and when it
anticipates it will engage in Brownfield. From this two cases I will obtain three pollution allotments: two
for the Greenfield case (one for the settled firms and one new firms), and one for the Brownfield case.
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The order of the play is as follows:
1. Firm N chooses an internationalization strategy (No int, B, G).
2. Given firms’ decisions, governments set their welfare-maximizing emission standards.
3. Firm S2 decides whether it sells or not (Sell, no sell), in the case that N chooses to undertake
Brownfield.
4. Firm N decides how many products it should produce if it undertakes Brownfield (B1, B2, B3).
5. Firms compete in quantities. If N acquires an existing firm, I will have two firms competing a la
Cournot, but three firms if N settles a new factory.
I will analyze its decision under Greenfield and Brownfield type 1, as I shoId that this type of invest-
ment leads to the highest profits of the three options under any possible condition.
5.4.1 When the North firm enters as Greenfield investor
Firms maximize the following profit functions:
ΠNG = pxx− (c+ θ − e1)x− FG
ΠS1G = pyyS1 − (c+ θ − e0)yS1 (6)
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ΠS2G = pyyS2 − (c+ θ − e0)yS2
Where the subscript NG means the equilibrium variable for the North firm given that the North firm
has decided to undertake Greenfield investment in the first stage. Similarly, S1G and S2G refer to the
equilibrium variable for South firms when N firm engages in Greenfield investment. FG refers to the fixed
cost of setting a new factory in the South country.
Via maximization, we obtain the following equilibrium profits 24:
ΠNG =
1
2
(a(2γ − 3)− 2γ(c+ θ − e0) + 3(c+ θ − e1))2
2(γ2 − 3)2 − 2FG
ΠS1G = ΠS2G =
(a(γ − 2)− γ(c+ θ − e1) + 2(c+ θ − e0))2
4(γ2 − 3)2
Now, the government maximizes the global welfare in the South country:
WG = CSY + CSX + ΠS1G + ΠS2G − e0Y − e1X
Where CSX and CSY are the consumer surplus obtained from the consumption of both goods, and
e0Y + e1X is the pollution derivate from the production process of both goods. If I assume that every
unit of pollution leads to a unit cost on society, then e0Y + e1X is the total social cost of polluting.
Via maximization I obtain the following equilibrium values for the pollution permissions 25:
e0 =
(γ − 3)(a− c− θ)
2(γ2 − 3) , e1 =
(1− γ)(a− c− θ)
γ2 − 3
Substituting, I obtain the following profits:
ΠNG =
1
(γ2 − 3)2 (a
2(γ − 1)2 + c2(γ − 1)2(+γ2 − 3)2 + 2c(γ − 1)2θ+ (γ − 1)2θ2 − 2a(γ − 1)2(c+ θ))−FG
ΠS1G = ΠS2G =
(γ − 3)2(c+ θ − a)2
4(γ2 − 3)2
24For first order and non-negative conditions, see Appendix 7
25See Appendix 7
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The North firm will invest in Greenfield investment under an endogenous emission standard when the
fixed cost is below a threshold, that is:
F <
(γ − 1)2(c+ θ − a)2
(γ2 − 3)2
Comparing both emission standards, I find that e0− e1 = (3γ−5)(a−c−θ)2(γ2−3) , thus e1 will be lower than e0
only when θ > a− c, that is when the industry is so polluting that the social cost outweighs the market
profitability. In this case, the old standard could be more strict than the new one. This is a extreme case
that would need to be considered separately, but will not be covered in this paper.
For a market where a > c+ θ, which means that the market is profitable enough to cover both the costs
of the firms and the social pollution cost, the standard for newly set firms will be more strict than the
old standard. This leads us to the next proposition:
Proposition 2:
When the environmental regulation is settled endogenously, the regulation for newly settled firms e1 will
always be more strict than the regulation for the already settled firms e0.
When setting a pollution standard, the government faces a tradeoff: a high emission standard (lax
policy) yields a higher cost on society, but allows for a greater production, which benefits both the
consumer and producer surplus. On the other hand, a loIr emission standard (strict policy), minimizes
the cost on society but reduces the producer and consumer surplus due to the decrease in the quantity
produced.
When the industry is not excessively polluting, the environmental policy is more strict for newly
settled firm than for the other firms. This means that, for the newly settled firms, their contribution to
the pollution is more harmful than for the settled firms relative to their contribution to the consumer
surplus. This is due to the fact that, even tough they contribute to the consumer surplus by selling their
product, because it is a foreign firm, its profits are not a part of the social welfare of the South country.
This is in line with the assumptions of the emission standard for new firms being more strict than the
one for the already settled national firms, which is one of my main assumptions in the first part of this
paper.
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Furthermore, if I analyse the impact of the pollution level of the industry, I see that this has a pos-
itive impact in both e0 and e1, meaning that the more pollutant the industry is, the more strict the
environmental regulation will be for both old and newly settled firms. I also see that the market size has
a positive impact in the emission standard, which is in line with the results by Dong et al. (2012), that
show how small markets can lead to more stringent emission standards.
This simple model supports the idea that, even though the emission standards could get more strict
over time due to international pressure, it is also a strategic decision for the recipient country. In this
simple model I do not account for the creation of new national firms that would be harmed by a tighter
permission, but if I take that the increasing globalization leads to an increased international trade, a
bigger number of international firms subject to a more strict standard will compensate for the loss of
welfare of the newly created national firms.
5.4.2 When the North firm enters as an acquirer
When ΠNG > 0 In this scenario, the best option for the North firm if no firm in the South wants to
sell its factory, is engaging in Greenfield investment. Thus, the North firm will always have to pay to the
South firm at least its Greenfield profits in order to acquire it, so the fixed cost FB will be equal to ΠS2G
for the three next cases.
When the North firm produces X and Y, then profits are:
ΠNB1 = pxx+ pyyN − (c− e0 + θ)(x+ yN )− FB
ΠS1B1 = pyyS1 − yS1(c− e0 + θ) (7)
Where the subscript NB1, S1B1 and S2B1 means the equilibrium variable for the respective firms
given that the North firm has decided to undertake Brownfield investment in the first stage.
Via maximization, I obtain the following profits 26:
ΠNB1 =
(1− γ)(a− c− e+ θ)2
4(1 + γ)
, ΠS1B1 =
1
9
(a− c− e+ θ)2
26For first order and non-negative conditions, see Appendix 8.
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Now, the government maximizes the global Ilfare in the South country:
WB = CSY + CSX + ΠS1G + ΠS2G − e0(X + Y )
In this case the old regulation will be the same for the two firms, hence the unitary level of pollution
derived from the production of the two goods will be the same.
Through maximization, I obtain the following pollution permission and profits 27:
e0 =
3(1− γ)(a− c− θ)
γ − 17
ΠNB1 =
1
9(γ − 17)2(γ − 1)(a
2(7 + γ)2(5γ − 13) + c2(7 + γ)2(5γ − 13) + 2c(7 + γ)2(5γ − 13)θ
+(7 + γ)2(5γ − 13)θ2 − 2a(7 + γ)2(−13 + 5γ)(c+ θ))− Fb
ΠS1B1 =
1
9
(a− c+ e0 − θ)2
If I substitute Fb = ΠS2G =
(γ−3)2(c+θ−a)2
4(γ2−3)2 , I obtain:
ΠNB1 = − ((477 + γ(7317 + γ(3498 + γ(2826 + γ(−4267 + γ(141 + 4γ(57 + 5γ)))))))(−a+ c+ θ)
2)
(36(−17 + γ)2(1 + γ)(−3 + γ2)2)
Which is negative, meaning that the fixed cost that the North firm has to pay to firm S2 in order to
acquire it, is too high when I account for the endogenous environmental regulation. This means that this
internationalisation strategy is not profitable, and the North firm will not engage in it.
When ΠNG ≤ 0 Now I study the case in which Greenfield benefit is negative. This will happen when
the emission standard is so high that it offsets the benefit from exploiting the South market, that is when
a ≤ c+ θ − e1.
In this case, the best option for the North firm if no firm in the South wants to sell its factory, is not
internationalising its production. Thus the North firm will always have to pay to the South firm at least
its Duopoly profits in order to acquire it, so the fixed cost FB will be equal to ΠS2D for the three next cases.
27See Appendix 8.
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When the North firm produces both products, then profits are 28:
ΠNB1 = pxx+ pyyN − (x+ yN )(c− e0 + θ)− FB
ΠS1B1 = pyyS1 − (c− e0 + θ)yS1x (8)
ΠS2B1 = ΠS2D
Where the subscript NB1, S1B1 and S2B1 means the equilibrium variable for the respective firms
given that the North firm has decided to undertake Brownfield investment in the first stage, and S2D
refers to the duopoly profits of the firm S2.
Via maximisation I obtain the following profits:
Then, the equilibrium profits are:
ΠNB1 =
1
36(1 + γ)
(13c2 + 26ce+ 13e2 + a2(13− 5γ)− 5c2γ − 10ceγ − 5e2γ + 2a(−13 + 5γ)(c+ e− θ)
+2(c+ e)(−13 + 5γ)θ + (13− 5γ)θ2)− Fb (36 + 36γ)
36(1 + γ)
ΠS1B1 =
1
9
(a− c+ e0 − θ)2
Now, the government maximizes the global welfare in the South country:
WB = CSY + CSX + ΠS1G + ΠS2G − e0(X + Y )
Since the welfare function is not concave, the maximum value for the welfare will be either the
maximum or the minimum pollution standard, being e0 = 0 or e0 = θ respectively.
I obtain the welfare values for both, which are WB(e0 = 0) =
(41+23γ)(a−c+θ)2
72(1+γ) and WB(e0 = θ) =
(a−c)((a−c)(41+23γ)−12(7+γ)θ)
72(1+γ) . Now I proceed to compare both values:
WB(e0 = 0)−WB(e0 = θ) = θ(2(a− c)(83 + 29γ) + (41 + 23γ)θ)
72(1 + γ)
28For first order and non-negative conditions, refer to Appendix 9
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Which is always positive. Thus, under this condition, the emission standard will be the more possibly
stringent, which is an allowance of 0 units of pollution for all the producing firms.
Comparing the emission standards under Greenfield and Brownfield strategies I observe that, when the
North firm engages in Greenfield investment, the pollution allowance is positive. This is becasue the
increase in the consumer surplus offsets the increase in pollution. But when the North firm engages in
Browfield investment, one of the firm’s profits stops contributing to the global welfare, thus the increase
in pollution is not compensated by the increase in the consumer surplus anymore.
5.5 Conclusions
Despite a large increase in the empirical literature that investigates the link between environmental
policy and FDI the results remain inconclusive. This article studies the interrelationship between FDI
and environmental policy using a North-South model that may go some way to explain this lack of robust
evidence. The policy instrument considered in the model is a conventional CAC one emission standard
regulation and does not generate any fiscal revenues for the government. Thus it induces no incentive
distortion on the regulators’ environmental policy decisions. Firms compete a la Cournot subject to
the country’s domestic environmental standard. Pollution is non-transboundary and emissions are only
accompanied by production.
An important finding of this article is that a tightening of the current environmental regulation does
not necessarily reduce the profitability of foreign firms and the probability of choosing FDI as the pre-
ferred mode of entry, but incentivize the Brownfield investment over the Greenfield investment when the
market is big enough and the products are not differentiated. This can explain the mixed results about the
relationship between FDI and environmental regulation in the literature hitherto. Our model provides a
theoretical framework that can explain how different stringencies would not have a directly positive or neg-
ative impact in the FDI patterns, but rather change the composition in the industry by attracting dirtier
or cleaner production processes, depending on parameters as the market size and product substitutability.
We also provide some evidence for a theoretical explanation of the grandfathering policies, showing
that it is a strategic decision to implement a higher allowance for the domestic settled firms and a lower
allowance for the newly settled firms, thus giving consistency to our model’s initial assumptions.
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5.7 Appendix 1
For the three cases considered under exogenous pollution standards, I obtain the following Nash eqilib-
ria:
i) If ΠNG > ΠNB1 > 0 (that will hold when FG is loIr than a threshold τ), then I obtain 22 Nash
equilibria:
((G, B1, G), sell), ((G, B1, no), sell), ((G, B2, G), sell), ((G, B2, no), sell), ((G, B3, G), sell), ((G, B3,
no), sell), ((G, B1, G), sell), ((G, B1, no), sell), ((G, B2, G), sell), ((G, B2, no), sell), ((G, B3, G), sell),
((G, B3, no), sell), ((G, B1, G), no sell), ((G, B1, no), no sell), ((G, B2, G), no sell), ((G, B2, no), no
sell), ((G, B3, G), no sell), ((G, B3, no), no sell), ((G, B1, G), no sell), ((G, B1, no), no sell), ((G, B2,
G), no sell), ((G, B2, no), no sell), ((G, B3, G), no sell), ((G, B3, no), no sell).
ii) If ΠB1 > ΠNG > 0 (that will hold when FG is higher than a threshold τ), I obtain 12 Nash equilibria:
((G, B1, G), no sell), ((G, B1, no), no sell), ((G, B2, G), no sell), ((G, B2, no), no sell), ((G, B3, G), no
sell), ((G, B3, no), no sell), ((G, B1, G), no sell), ((G, B1, no), no sell), ((G, B2, G), no sell), ((G, B2,
no), no sell), ((G, B3, G), no sell), ((G, B3, no), no sell), ((B, B1, G), sell).
iii) If ΠNB1 > 0 > ΠNG > 0 (that will hold under the condition F >
(a(2γ−3)−2γ(c+e0−θ)+3(c+e1−θ))2
4(γ2−3)2 ), I
obtain two NE, that are:
((B, B1, G), sell) and ((B, B1, No int), sell).
The way to interpret the Nash equilibrium is the following: the first three strategies inside the
parenthesis refer to the North’s decision in the nodes 1, 3 and 4. The remaining strategy is the South 1
decision in the node 2.
5.8 Appendix 2
When the environmental standard is exogenous and the North firm enters as Greenfield investor, firms
maximize the following profit functions:
ΠNG = pxx− (c+ θ − e1)x− FG
ΠS1G = pyyS1 − (c+ θ − e0)yS1 (9)
ΠS2G = pyyS2 − (c+ θ − e0)yS2
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From maximizing the profit functions I obtain the following first order conditions:
dΠNG
dx
= a− c+ e1−2x− (yS1 + yS2)γ − θ = 0
dΠS1G
dyS1
= a− c+ e0 − 2yS1 − yS2 − xγ − θ = 0
dΠS2G
dyS2
= a− c+ e0 − yS1 − 2yS2 − xγ − θ = 0
The equilibrium quantities to this game are:
x =
a(2γ − 3)− 2γ(c+ θ − e0) + 3(c+ θ − e1)
2γ2 − 3 (10)
yS1 = yS2 =
a(γ − 2) + 2(c+ θ − e0)− γ(c+ θ − e1)
2(γ2 − 3) (11)
If I substitute (10) and (11) in (9), the equilibrium profits are:
ΠNG =
1
2
(a(2γ − 3)− 2γ(c+ θ − e0) + 3(c+ θ − e1))2
2(γ2 − 3)2 − 2FG
ΠS1G = ΠS2G =
(a(γ − 2)− γ(c+ θ − e1) + 2(c+ θ − e0))2
4(γ2 − 3)2
To give consistency to the model, the condition of positive equilibrium quantities has to be included:
x will always be positive if e1 <
a−c−θ
6γ−9 − 2e0γ3 holds.
Profits will always be positive if the fixed cost is below a threshold, that is:
F <
(a(2γ − 3)− 2γ(c+ θ − e0) + 3(c+ θ − e1))2
4 (γ2 − 3)2
From now on, I will denote this threshold by τG, hence τG = (a(2γ−3)−2γ(c+θ−e0)+3(c+θ−e1))
2
4(γ2−3)2 .
5.9 Appendix 3
When the environmental standard is exogenous, the North firm enters as an acquirer and ΠNG > 0,
firms maximize the following profit functions :
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ΠNB1 = pxx+ pyyN − (c+ θ − e0)(x+ yN )− FB (12)
ΠS1B1 = pyyS1 − yS1(c+ θ − e0) (13)
From maximizing the profit functions I obtain the following first order conditions:
dΠNB1
dx
= a− c− e0 − 2x− (2yN + yS1)γ + θ = 0
dΠNB1
dyN
= a− c− e0 − 2yN − yS1 − 2xγ + θ = 0
dΠS1B1
dyS1
= a− c− e0 − yN − 2yS1 − xγ + θ = 0
Then, the equilibrium quantities are:
yN =
1
3
(a− c− e0 − θ), x = a− c+ e0 − θ
2γ + 2
, yS1 =
(2− γ)(a− c+ e0 − θ)
6(γ + 1)
(14)
If I substitute (14) in (12) and (12), the equilibrium profits are:
ΠNB1 =
1
36(1 + γ)
(13c2 + 26ce0 + 13e
2
0 + a
2(13− 5γ)− 5c2γ − 10ce0γ − 5e20γ + 2a(−13 + 5γ)(c+ e0 − θ)
+2(c+ e0)(−13 + 5γ)θ + (13− 5γ)θ2)− Fb(36 + 36γ)
36(1 + γ)
ΠS1B1 =
1
9
(a− c+ e0 − θ)2
ΠNB1 will be positive if FB <
(13−5γ)(a−c+e0−θ)2
36(1+γ) . As mentioned before, FB = ΠS2G in this section.
Substituting: (a(γ−2)−γ(c+θ−e1)+2(c+θ−e0))
2
4(γ2−3)2 <
(13−5γ)(a−c+e0−θ)2
36(1+γ) .
Because (a(γ−2)−γ(c+θ−e1)+2(c+θ−e0))
2
4(γ2−3)2 − (13−5γ)(a−c+e0−θ)
2
36(1+γ) < 0, ΠNB1 will always be positive.
Finally, if I substitute FB in ΠNB1, I obtain:
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ΠNB1 =
1
36
(
9(γ − 3)2(a− c− θ)2
(γ2 − 3)2 −
2(γ − 2)(a− c+ e0 − θ)(a+ 2(c− e0 + θ))
γ + 1
+
6(γ − 5)(a(γ(13γ − 10)− 131)− 6(γ + 7)2(c+ θ))(a− c+ e0 − θ)
(γ − 17)(γ + 1)(7γ + 25)
−3(a− c+ e0 − θ)(a(γ − 3)− (γ + 3)(c− e0 + θ))
γ + 1
)
5.10 Appendix 4
When the environmental standard is exogenous, N enters as an investor, and ΠNG ≥ 0.
Here I consider the special cases where N enters the South country as an investor, and produces only
one product (either X or Y). Then, I will compare the profits to the main case (producing both).
For simplicity, I will denote the main case as Brownfield type 1, producing Y as Brownfield 2, and pro-
ducing X as Brownfield 3.
i) When the North firm only produces its own product X, firms maximize the following profit functions:
ΠNB2 = pxx− x(c− e0 + θ)− FB
ΠS1B2 = pyyS1 − (c− e0 + θ)yS1 (15)
From maximizing the profit functions I obtain the following first order conditions:
dΠNB2
dx
= a− c− e0 − 2x− yγ + θ = 0
dΠS1B2
dyS1
= a− c− e0 − 2y − xγ + θ = 0
Then, the equilibrium quantities are:
x = yS1 =
a− c+ e0 − θ
γ + 2
(16)
Substituting (16) in (15) I obtain the following profits:
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ΠNB2 =
(2 + γ)2 + (a− c+ e0 − θ)2
(2 + γ)2 − FB , ΠS1B2 =
(a− c+ e0 − θ)2
(2 + γ)2
ΠNB2 will be positive when the fixed cost is lower than a threshold, which is FB <
(a−c+e−θ)2
(2+γ)2 . As
mentioned before, FB = ΠS2G in this section.
Substituting: (a(γ−2)−γ(c+θ−e1)+2(c+θ−e0))
2
4(γ2−3)2 <
(a−c+e0−θ)2
(2+γ)2
Because (a(γ−2)−γ(c+θ−e1)+2(c+θ−e0))
2
4(γ2−3)2 − (a−c+e0−θ)
2
(2+γ)2 < 0, ΠNB2 will always be positive.
Finally, if I substitute FB in ΠNB2, I obtain:
ΠNB2 =
(a(2− γ)− 2(c+ e0 − θ) + γ(c+ e1 − θ))2
4(γ2 − 3)2
+
(c+ e0 − θ)(−a+ c+ e0 − θ)
2 + γ
+
(a+ (1 + γ)(c+ e0 − θ))(a− c− e0 + θ)
(2 + γ)2
ii) When the North firm produces only the South firm’s product Y, firms maximize the following
profit functions:
ΠNB3 = pyyN − yN (c− e0 + θ)− FB
ΠS1B3 = pyyS1 − yS1(c− e0 + θ) (17)
From maximizing the profit functions I obtain the following first order conditions:
dΠNB3
dyN
= a− c− e0 − yS1 − 2yN + θ = 0
dΠS1B3
dyS1
= a− c− e0 − 2yS1 − yN + θ = 0
Then, the equilibrium quantities and profits are:
yS1 = yS2 =
1
3
(a− c+ e0 − θ) (18)
Substituting (18) in (17) I obtain the following profits:
ΠNB3 =
1
9
(a− c+ e0 − θ)2 − FB , ΠS1B3 = 1
9
(a− c+ e0 − θ)2
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ΠNB3 will be positive when the fixed cost is lower than a threshold, which is
FB <
1
9 (a− c+ e− θ)2. As mentioned before, FB = ΠS2G in this section.
Substituting: (a(γ−2)−γ(c+θ−e1)+2(c+θ−e0))
2
4(γ2−3)2 <
1
9 (a− c+ e0 − θ)2
Because (a(γ−2)−γ(c+θ−e1)+2(c+θ−e0))
2
4(γ2−3)2 − 19 (a− c+ e0 − θ)2 < 0, ΠNB2 will always be positive.
Finally, if I substitute FB in ΠNB2, I obtain:
ΠNB3 =
1
12
(
3(a(2− γ)− 2(c+ e0 − θ) + γ(c+ e1 − θ))2
(γ2 − 3)2 + 4(c+ e0 − θ)(+c+ e0 − θ − a)
+
4
3
(a+ 2(c+ e0 − θ))(a− c− e0 + θ))
Now I proceed to compare the benefits under the three possible Brownfield modes of entry.
• Brownfield 1 VS Brownfield 2: ΠNB1 −ΠNB2 = (1−γ)(16+γ(12+5γ))(a−c+e0−θ)
2
36(1+γ)(2+γ)2 which is positive.
• Brownfield 1 VS Brownfield 3: ΠNB1 −ΠNB3 = (1−γ)(a−c+e0−θ)
2
4(1+γ) which is positive.
• Brownfield 2 VS Brownfield 3: ΠNB2 −ΠNB3 = (1−γ)(5+γ)(a−c+e0−θ)
2
9(2+γ)2 which is positive.
Thus, meaning that ΠNB1 > ΠNB2 > ΠNB3.
5.11 Appendix 5
When the environmental standard is exogenous, N enters as an investor and ΠNG ≤ 0, firms maximize
the following profit functions:
ΠNB1 = pxx+ pyyN − (x+ yN )(c− e0 + θ)− FB
ΠS1B1 = pyyS1 − (c− e0 + θ)yS1 (19)
From maximizing the profit functions I obtain the following first order conditions:
dΠNB1
dx
= a− c− e0 − 2x− (2yN + yS1)γ + θ = 0
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dΠNB1
dyN
= a− c− e0 − 2yN − yS1 − 2xγ + θ = 0
dΠS1B1
dyS1
= a− c− e0 − yN − 2yS1 − xγ + θ = 0
Then, the equilibrium quantities are:
x =
a− c+ e0 − θ
2γ + 2
, yS1 =
1
3
(a− c+ e0 − θ), yS2 = (2− γ)(a− c+ e0 − θ)
6(γ + 1)
(20)
If I substitute (20) in (19) I obtain the following profits:
ΠNB1 =
1
36(1 + γ)
(13c2 + 26ce0 + 13e
2
0 + a
2(13− 5γ)− 5c2γ − 10ce0γ − 5e20γ + 2a(5γ − 13)(c+ e0 − θ)
+2(c+ e0)(−13 + 5γ)θ + (13− 5γ)θ2)− FB(36 + 36γ)
36(1 + γ)
ΠS1B1 =
1
9
(a− c+ e0 − θ)2
ΠNB1 will be positive if FB <
(13−5γ)(a−c+e0−θ)2
36(1+γ) . As mentioned before, FB = ΠS2D in this section.
Substituting: 19 (a− c+ e0 − θ)2 < (13−5γ)(a−c+e0−θ)
2
36(1+γ) .
Because 19 (a− c+ e0 − θ)2 − (13−5γ)(a−c+e0−θ)
2
36(1+γ) < 0, ΠNB1 will always be positive.
Finally, if I substitute FB in ΠNB1, I obtain:
ΠNB1 =
(1− γ)(a− c+ e0 − θ)2
4(γ + 1)
5.12 Appendix 6
When the environmental standard is exogenous, N enters as an investor, and ΠNG ≤ 0.
Here I consider the special cases where N enters the South country as an investor, and produces only
one product (either X or Y). Then, I will compare the profits to the main case (producing both).
For simplicity, I will denote the main case as Brownfield type 1, producing Y as Brownfield 2, and pro-
ducing X as Brownfield 3.
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i) When the North firm only produces its own product, firms maximize the following profit functions:
ΠNB2 = pxx− (c+ θ − e0)x− FB
ΠS1B2 = pyyS1 − (c+ θ − e0)yS1 (21)
From maximizing the profit functions I obtain the following first order conditions:
dΠNB2
dx
= a− c+ e0 − 2x− yS1γ − θ = 0
dΠS1B2
dyS1
= a− c+ e0 − 2yS1 − xγ − θ = 0
Then, the equilibrium quantities are:
x = yS1 =
a− c+ e0 − θ
2 + γ
(22)
If I substitute (22) in (21) I obtain the following profits:
ΠNB2 =
(2 + γ)2 + (a− c+ e0 − θ)2
(2 + γ)2 − FB , ΠS1B2 =
(a− c+ e0 − θ)2
(2 + γ)2
ΠNB2 will be positive when the fixed cost is lower than a threshold, which is Fb <
(a−c+e−θ)2
(2+γ)2 . As
mentioned before, FB = ΠS2D in this section.
Substituting: 19 (a− c+ e0 − θ)2 < (a−c+e0−θ)
2
(2+γ)2
Because 19 (a− c+ e0 − θ)2 − (a−c+e0−θ)
2
(2+γ)2 < 0, ΠNB2 will always be positive.
Finally, if I substitute FB in ΠNB2, I obtain:
ΠNB2 =
(c(5 + γ)− a(5 + γ) + (γ − 1)(e0 − θ))(c+ a(γ − 1)− cγ − (5 + γ)(e0 − θ))
9(2 + γ)2
ii) When the North firm produces only the South firm’s product, firms maximize the following profit
functions:
ΠNB3 = pyyS2 − yS2(c− e0 + θ)− FB
ΠS1B3 = pyyS1 − yS1(c− e0 + θ) (23)
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From maximizing the profit functions I obtain the following first order conditions:
dΠNB3
dyN
= a− c− e0 − yS1 − 2yN + θ = 0
dΠS1B3
dyS1
= a− c− e0 − 2yS1 − yN + θ = 0
Then, the equilibrium quantities are:
yN = yS1 =
1
3
(a− c− e0 + θ) (24)
If I substitute (24) in (23) I obtain the following profits:
ΠNB3 =
1
9
(a− c+ e0 − θ)2 − FB , ΠS1B3 = 1
9
(a− c+ e0 − θ)2
ΠNB3 will be positive when the fixed cost is loIr than a threshold, which is FB <
1
9 (a − c + e − θ)2.
As mentioned before, FB = ΠS2G in this section.
Substituting: 19(a− c+ e0 − θ)2 < 19 (a− c+ e0 − θ)2
Because 19 (a− c+ e− θ)2 − 19 (a− c+ e− θ)2 = 0, ΠNB2 will be equal to 0, thus the North firm will
be indifferent between engaging in Brownfield type 3 and not internationalising.
Finally, if I substitute FB in ΠNB3, I obtain:
ΠNB3 = 0
Now I proceed to compare the three modes of Brownfield entry:
• Brownfield 1 VS Brownfield 2: ΠNB1 − ΠNB2 = (1−γ)(γ(5γ+12)+16)(a−c+e0−θ)
2
36(γ+1)(γ+2)2 , which is positive,
meaning that Brownfield type 1 leads to higher profits.
• Brownfield 3 VS Brownfield 3: ΠNB2 − ΠNB3 = (1−γ)(γ+5)(a−c+e0−θ)
2
9(γ+2)2 which is positive, meaning
that Brownfield type 2 leads to higher profits.
• Brownfield 1 VS Brownfield 3: ΠNB1 − ΠNB3 = (1−γ)(a−c+e0−θ)
2
4(γ+1) which is positive, meaning that
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Brownfield type 1 leads to higher profits.
Thus, meaning that ΠNB1 > ΠNB2 > ΠNB3. It is always more profitable for the North firm to engage
in Brownfield type 1 for any given condition.
5.13 Appendix 7
When the environmental standard is endogenous and the North firm enters as Greenfield investor,
firms maximize the following profit functions:
ΠNG = pxx− (c+ θ − e1)x− FG
ΠS1G = pyyS1 − (c+ θ − e0)yS1 (25)
ΠS2G = pyyS2 − (c+ θ − e0)yS2
From maximizing the profit functions I obtain the following first order conditions:
dΠNG
dx
= a− c− e1 − 2x− (yS1 + yS2)γ + θ = 0
dΠS1G
dyS1
= a− c− e0 − 2yS1 − yS2 − xγ + θ = 0
dΠS2G
dyS2
= a− c− e0 − yS1 − 2yS2 − xγ + θ = 0
The equilibrium quantities to this game are:
x =
a(2γ − 3)− 2γ(c+ θ − e0) + 3(c+ θ − e1)
2γ2 − 3 (26)
yS1 = yS2 =
a(γ − 2) + 2(c+ θ − e0)− γ(c+ θ − e1)
2(γ2 − 3)
If I substitute (26) in (25), the equilibrium profits are:
ΠNG =
1
2
(a(2γ − 3)− 2γ(c+ θ − e0) + 3(c+ θ − e1))2
2(γ2 − 3)2 − 2FG
ΠS1G = ΠS2G =
(a(γ − 2)− γ(c+ θ − e1) + 2(c+ θ − e0))2
4(γ2 − 3)2
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Now, the government maximizes the global welfare in the South country:
WG = CSY + CSX + ΠS1G + ΠS2G − e0Y − e1X
Where CSX and CSY are the consumer surplus obtained from the consumption of both goods, and
e0Y + e1X is the pollution derivate from the production process of both goods. If I assume that every
unit of pollution leads to a unit cost on society, then e0Y + e1X is the total social cost of polluting.
I first check that the welfare function is concave in the pollutions standards. For this, I compute the
second derivatives respect to e0 and e1.
d2WG
e20
= γ
2−4
(γ2−3)2 , and
d2WG
e21
= 8γ
2−27
4(γ2−3)2 . With both values
being negative, I can confirm that the welfare function of the South country is concave in the pollution
standards, thus the South country will set them so as to maximize its welfare.
Through maximization, I obtain the following first order conditions:
dWG
de0
=
a
(
4 + γ − 2γ2)− 4(c+ 2e0 + θ)− γ(c− 2cγ + e1(2γ2 − 7) + θ − 2γ(e0 + θ))
2 (−3 + γ2)2 = 0
dWG
de1
=
a(−9 + 2γ(1 + γ)) + 9(c− 3e1 + θ)− 2γ(−7e0 + c(1 + γ) + θ + γ(−4e1 + 2eγ + θ))
4 (−3 + γ2)2 = 0
The equilibrium values for the pollution permissions are:
e0 =
(γ − 3)(a− c− θ)
2(γ2 − 3) , e1 =
(1− γ)(a− c− θ)
γ2 − 3
Substituting, I obtain the following quantities and profits:
x =
(a− c)(γ − 2) + (γ − 1)θ
(γ2 − 3) , yS1 = yS2 =
(a− c)(γ − 1) + (γ − 3)θ
2(γ2 − 3)
ΠNG =
1
(γ2 − 3)2 (a
2(γ − 1)2 + c2(γ − 1)2(+γ2 − 3)2 + 2c(γ − 1)2θ+ (γ − 1)2θ2 − 2a(γ − 1)2(c+ θ))−FG
ΠS1G = ΠS2G =
(γ − 3)2(c+ θ − a)2
4(γ2 − 3)2
The North firm will invest in Greenfield investment under an endogenous emission standard when the
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fixed cost is below a threshold, that is:
F <
(γ − 1)2(c+ θ − a)2
(γ2 − 3)2
5.14 Appendix 8
When the environmental standard is endogenous, N enters as an acquirer and ΠNG > 0, firms maxi-
mize the following profits:
ΠNB1 = pxx+ pyyN − (c− e0 + θ)(x+ yN )− FB
ΠS1B1 = pyyS1 − yS1(c− e0 + θ) (27)
From maximizing the profit functions I obtain the following first order conditions:
dΠNB1
dx
= a− c− e0 − 2x− (2yN + yS1)γ + θ = 0
dΠNB1
dyN
= a− c− e0 − 2yN − yS1 − 2xγ + θ = 0
dΠS1B1
dyS1
= a− c− e0 − yN − 2yS1 − xγ + θ = 0
Then, the equilibrium quantities and profits are:
yN =
1
3
(a− c− e0 − θ), x = a− c+ e0 − θ
2γ + 2
, yS1 =
(2− γ)(a− c+ e0 − θ)
6(γ + 1)
(28)
Substituting (28) in (27) I obtain:
ΠNB1 =
(1− γ)(a− c− e+ θ)2
4(1 + γ)
, ΠS1B1 =
1
9
(a− c− e+ θ)2
Now, the government maximizes the global welfare in the South country:
WB = CSY + CSX + ΠS1G + ΠS2G − e0(X + Y )
In this case the old regulation will be the same for the two firms, hence the unitary level of pollution
derived from the production of the two goods will be the same. I first check that the welfare function
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is concave in the pollution standard. I compute the second derivative respect to e0.
d2WG
e20
= γ−1712(1+γ) .
Since this value is negative, I can confirm that the welfare function of the South country is concave in
the pollution standard, thus the South country will set it so as to maximize its Ilfare.
Through maximization, I obtain the following first order conditions and value for the pollution per-
mission:
dWB
de0
=
e0(γ − 17) + 3a(γ − 1)− 3c(γ − 1)− 3(γ − 1)θ
12(γ + 1)
= 0
e0 =
3(1− γ)(a− c− θ)
γ − 17
Substituting I obtain the following quantities and profits:
x =
(γ − 7)(a− c− θ)
(γ − 17)(1 + γ) , yN =
(γ − 2)(7 + γ)(a− c− θ)
3(γ − 17)(1 + γ) , yS =
2(γ − 7)(a− c− θ)
3(γ − 17)
ΠNB1 =
1
9(γ − 17)2(γ − 1)(a
2(7 + γ)2(5γ − 13) + c2(7 + γ)2(5γ − 13) + 2c(7 + γ)2(5γ − 13)θ
+(7 + γ)2(5γ − 13)θ2 − 2a(7 + γ)2(−13 + 5γ)(c+ θ))− Fb
ΠS1B1 =
1
9
(a− c+ e0 − θ)2
If I substitute Fb = ΠS2G =
(γ−3)2(c+θ−a)2
4(γ2−3)2 , I obtain:
ΠNB1 = − ((477 + γ(7317 + γ(3498 + γ(2826 + γ(−4267 + γ(141 + 4γ(57 + 5γ)))))))(−a+ c+ θ)
2)
(36(−17 + γ)2(1 + γ)(−3 + γ2)2)
5.15 Appendix 9
When the emission standard is endogenous, N enters as an acquirer and ΠNG ≤ 0, firms maximize
the following profits:
ΠNB1 = pxx+ pyyN − (x+ yN )(c− e0 + θ)− FB
ΠS1B1 = pyyS1 − (c− e0 + θ)yS1 (29)
103
ΠS2B1 = ΠS2D
From maximizing the profit functions I obtain the following first order conditions:
dΠNB1
dx
= a− c− e0 − 2x− (2yN + yS1)γ + θ = 0
dΠNB1
dyN
= a− c− e0 − 2yN − yS1 − 2xγ + θ = 0
dΠS1B1
dyS1
= a− c− e0 − yN − 2yS1 − xγ + θ = 0
Then, the equilibrium quantities and profits are:
x =
a− c+ e0 − θ
2γ + 2
, yS1 =
1
3
(a− c+ e0 − θ), yS2 = (2− γ)(a− c+ e0 − θ)
6(γ + 1)
ΠNB1 =
1
36(1 + γ)
(13c2 + 26ce+ 13e2 + a2(13− 5γ)− 5c2γ − 10ceγ − 5e2γ + 2a(−13 + 5γ)(c+ e− θ)
+2(c+ e)(−13 + 5γ)θ + (13− 5γ)θ2)− Fb (36 + 36γ)
36(1 + γ)
ΠS1B1 =
1
9
(a− c+ e0 − θ)2
Now, the government maximizes the global welfare in the South country:
WB = CSY + CSX + ΠS1G + ΠS2G − e0(X + Y )
I first check that the welfare function is concave in the pollution standard. I compute the second
derivative respect to e0.
d2WG
e20
= (γ+1)+9536(1+γ) . This value is positive, so this function is not concave. Thus,
the maximum value for the welfare will be either the maximum or the minimum pollution standard,
being e0 = 0 or e0 = θ respectively. I obtain the welfare values for both, and I get WB(e0 = 0) =
(41+23γ)(a−c+θ)2
72(1+γ) and WB(e0 = θ) =
(a−c)((a−c)(41+23γ)−12(7+γ)θ)
72(1+γ) . Now I proceed to compare both
values:
WB(e0 = 0)−WB(e0 = θ) = θ(2(a− c)(83 + 29γ) + (41 + 23γ)θ)
72(1 + γ)
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5.16 Appendix 10
For the three cases considered under endogenous pollution standards, I obtain the following Nash
eqilibria:
i) If ΠNG > ΠNB1 > 0 ( that will hold when F <
(γ−1)2(c+θ−a)2
(γ2−3)2 ), then I obtain 22 Nash equilibria:
((G, B1, G), (e0 =
(γ−3)(a−c−θ)
2(γ2−3) , e1 =
(1−γ)(a−c−θ)
γ2−3 ),sell), ((G, B1, no),(e0 =
(γ−3)(a−c−θ)
2(γ2−3) , e1 =
(1−γ)(a−c−θ)
γ2−3 ),
sell), ((G, B2, G),(e0 =
(γ−3)(a−c−θ)
2(γ2−3) , e1 =
(1−γ)(a−c−θ)
γ2−3 ), sell), ((G, B2, no), (e0 =
(γ−3)(a−c−θ)
2(γ2−3) , e1 =
(1−γ)(a−c−θ)
γ2−3 ),sell), ((G, B3, G),(e0 =
(γ−3)(a−c−θ)
2(γ2−3) , e1 =
(1−γ)(a−c−θ)
γ2−3 ), sell), ((G, B3, no),(e0 =
(γ−3)(a−c−θ)
2(γ2−3) , e1 =
(1−γ)(a−c−θ)
γ2−3 ), sell), ((G, B1, G),(e0 =
(γ−3)(a−c−θ)
2(γ2−3) , e1 =
(1−γ)(a−c−θ)
γ2−3 ), sell), ((G, B1, no),(e0 =
(γ−3)(a−c−θ)
2(γ2−3) , e1 =
(1−γ)(a−c−θ)
γ2−3 ), sell), ((G, B2, G), (e0 =
(γ−3)(a−c−θ)
2(γ2−3) , e1 =
(1−γ)(a−c−θ)
γ2−3 ),sell), ((G, B2,
no), (e0 =
(γ−3)(a−c−θ)
2(γ2−3) , e1 =
(1−γ)(a−c−θ)
γ2−3 ),sell), ((G, B3, G), (e0 =
(γ−3)(a−c−θ)
2(γ2−3) , e1 =
(1−γ)(a−c−θ)
γ2−3 ),sell),
((G, B3, no),(e0 =
(γ−3)(a−c−θ)
2(γ2−3) , e1 =
(1−γ)(a−c−θ)
γ2−3 ), sell), ((G, B1, G),(e0 =
(γ−3)(a−c−θ)
2(γ2−3) , e1 =
(1−γ)(a−c−θ)
γ2−3 ),
no sell), ((G, B1, no),(e0 =
(γ−3)(a−c−θ)
2(γ2−3) , e1 =
(1−γ)(a−c−θ)
γ2−3 ), no sell), ((G, B2, G),(e0 =
(γ−3)(a−c−θ)
2(γ2−3) , e1 =
(1−γ)(a−c−θ)
γ2−3 ), no sell), ((G, B2, no),(e0 =
(γ−3)(a−c−θ)
2(γ2−3) , e1 =
(1−γ)(a−c−θ)
γ2−3 ), no sell), ((G, B3, G),
(e0 =
(γ−3)(a−c−θ)
2(γ2−3) , e1 =
(1−γ)(a−c−θ)
γ2−3 ),no sell), ((G, B3, no),(e0 =
(γ−3)(a−c−θ)
2(γ2−3) , e1 =
(1−γ)(a−c−θ)
γ2−3 ), no
sell), ((G, B1, G), (e0 =
(γ−3)(a−c−θ)
2(γ2−3) , e1 =
(1−γ)(a−c−θ)
γ2−3 ),no sell), ((G, B1, no),(e0 =
(γ−3)(a−c−θ)
2(γ2−3) , e1 =
(1−γ)(a−c−θ)
γ2−3 ), no sell), ((G, B2, G),(e0 =
(γ−3)(a−c−θ)
2(γ2−3) , e1 =
(1−γ)(a−c−θ)
γ2−3 ), no sell), ((G, B2, no),(e0 =
(γ−3)(a−c−θ)
2(γ2−3) , e1 =
(1−γ)(a−c−θ)
γ2−3 ), no sell), ((G, B3, G),(e0 =
(γ−3)(a−c−θ)
2(γ2−3) , e1 =
(1−γ)(a−c−θ)
γ2−3 ), no sell),
((G, B3, no), (e0 =
(γ−3)(a−c−θ)
2(γ2−3) , e1 =
(1−γ)(a−c−θ)
γ2−3 ),no sell).
ii) If ΠNB1 > 0 > ΠNG > 0 (that will hold when F >
(γ−1)2(c+θ−a)2
(γ2−3)2 ,), I obtain two NE, that are:
((B, B1, G), (e0 = 0), sell) and ((B, B1, No int), (e0 = 0),sell).
The way to interpret the Nash equilibrium is sue following: the first three strategies inside the paren-
thesis refer to the North?s decision in the nodes 1, 3 and 4. The second strategy is the Government’s
decision on the environmental standard. The remaining strategy is the South 1 decision in the node 2.
Note that there is no possible scenario where ΠB1 > ΠNG > 0.
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